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This paper considers a simple model of credit risk and derives the limit distribution of losses 
under different assumptions regarding the structure of systematic and idiosyncratic risks and 
the nature of firm heterogeneity. The theoretical results obtained indicate that if firm-specific 
risk exposures (including their default thresholds) are heterogeneous but come from a 
common parameter distribution, for sufficiently large portfolios there is no scope for further 
risk reduction through active credit portfolio management. However, if the firm risk 
exposures are draws from different parameter distributions, say for different sectors or 
countries, then further risk reduction is possible, even asymptotically, by changing the 
portfolio weights. In either case, neglecting parameter heterogeneity can lead to 
underestimation of expected losses. But, once expected losses are controlled for, neglecting 
parameter heterogeneity can lead to overestimation of risk, whether measured by unexpected 
loss or value-at-risk. The theoretical results are confirmed empirically using returns and credit 
ratings for firms in the U.S. and Japan across seven sectors. Ignoring parameter heterogeneity 
results in far riskier credit portfolios. 
JEL Code: C33, G13, G21. 
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The importance of modeling correlated defaults has been recognized in the credit risk literature
for some time. Early treatment can be traced to the single homogeneous factor model due to
Vasicek (1987, 1991), which also forms the basis of New Basel Accord (BCBS, 2004) as outlined
in detail by Gordy (2003). Extensions to multiple factors were proposed by Wilson (1997a,b) and
Gupton, Finger and Bhatia (1997) in the form of the industry credit portfolio model CreditMetrics.1
Practically all of these models are adaptations of Merton’s (1974) options based approach, which
develops a simple model of ﬁrm performance with a threshold value below which the ﬁrm defaults.
In this paper we build on the seminal work of Vasicek and Gordy and examine the scope for
diversiﬁcation of a credit portfolio by allowing for ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity of the return process
as well as allowing for the default thresholds to vary across ﬁrm types, such as for instance by
credit rating. Our theoretical results indicate that if the ﬁrm parameters are heterogeneous but
come from a common distribution, there is no scope for further risk reduction for a suﬃciently
large portfolio, i.e. one where idiosyncratic risk has already been diversiﬁed away. This would
preclude gains from active portfolio management by changing the exposure weights (unless the
portfolio is small, of course). However, if the ﬁrm parameters come from diﬀerent distributions,
say for diﬀerent sectors or countries, there will be further scope for credit risk diversiﬁcation by
changing the portfolio weights, even in the case of suﬃciently large portfolios. In either case,
neglecting parameter heterogeneity can lead to underestimation of expected losses (EL). But once
EL is controlled for, neglecting parameter heterogeneity can lead to overestimation of unexpected
losses or risk, whether measured by loss volatility, i.e. unexpected loss (UL), or value-at-risk (VaR).
Diﬀerent degrees of heterogeneity are also assumed for the default thresholds which introduces
new complications. For the same return correlation, default correlations may be diﬀerent across
ﬁrms due to diﬀerences in default thresholds. In empirical applications the default threshold is
typically modeled as a function of the ﬁrm’s balance sheet. Not only is accounting information a
noisy and possibly unreliable indicator of a ﬁrm’s potential health, but in a multi-country setting
it presents additional challenges of diﬀerent accounting standards and bankruptcy rules. In view
of these measurement problems, Pesaran, Schuermann, Treutler, and Weiner (2005) propose an
alternative approach to estimating the default thresholds using ﬁrm-speciﬁc credit ratings and
historical default frequencies that we also adopt here.
We present empirical results for a portfolio of over 800 ﬁrms across U.S. and Japan. Return
regressions with diﬀerent degrees of parameter heterogeneity are estimated recursively using ten-
year rolling estimation windows, with the loss distributions simulated for six out-of-sample one-
year periods, allowing for diﬀerences in default thresholds by credit ratings. The results are found
1For a summary of this and other industry models, see Saunders and Allen (2002), and for detailed comparisons,
see Koyluoglu and Hickman (1998), Crouhy et al. (2000), and Gordy (2000).
2to be robust across the six years. We show that, for a given EL, risk is signiﬁcantly reduced
when parameter heterogeneity is taken into account. Importantly, the introduction of parameter
heterogeneity allows one to exploit whatever diversiﬁcation potential that might exist in the selected
sample portfolio. Allowing for the diﬀerences in default thresholds across ﬁrms with diﬀerent ratings
also proves to be of crucial importance. This is perhaps not surprising, considering that cross
ﬁrm default correlations tend to increase signiﬁcantly with a fall in credit ratings even if return
correlations remain ﬁxed across all ﬁrms in the portfolio. Note that ceteris paribus it is the default
correlations, and not the return correlations, that determine the shape of a credit loss distribution.
Our results have bearing on risk and capital management as well as the pricing of credit assets.
For example, in the case of a commercial bank, ignoring heterogeneity may result in underpro-
visioning for loan losses since EL is underestimated, and may result in overcapitalization against
(bank) default since risk is overestimated. The risk assessment and pricing of complex credit asset
such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) may be adversely aﬀected since they are driven by
the shape of the loss distribution which is segmented into tranches.
The most important distinction between our approach and the literature is around ﬁrm (or asset)
heterogeneity: the risky asset pricing literature typically develops a model for a representative bond
or ﬁrm.2 Naturally, there will always be idiosyncratic or ﬁrm-speciﬁcd i ﬀerences, also allowed for
in the risky asset pricing models. But our interest is in explicitly allowing for ﬁrm heterogeneity
with respect to both the default threshold (or distance to default) and systematic risk sensitivity,
an important dimension of diversiﬁcation. Along the way we are able to derive fat-tailed correlated
losses from Gaussian (i.e. non-fat-tailed) risk factors and explore the potential for (and limits of)
cross-sector and/or cross-country risk diversiﬁcation.
At a technical level we are able to generalize the theoretical results of Vasicek (1987, 1991) and
others (discussed in Gordy, 2000, 2003)) in a number of directions. By working with densities rather
than cumulative distribution functions we are able to derive a number of closed form solutions for
the loss density function under alternative assumptions regarding the probability distributions of
systematic and idiosyncratic shocks, as well as heterogeneous risk exposures across ﬁrms in the
portfolio. The earlier theoretical studies by Vasicek and others focus on the derivation of the
cumulative distribution function which limit closed form analysis to the relatively simple case of
the double-Gaussin shocks where the systematic and idiosyncratic shocks are both assumed to be
Gaussian.
The plan for the remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic model of
ﬁrm value and default. Section 3 considers the problem of correlated defaults. Section 4 derives
the portfolio loss distribution under diﬀerent heterogeneity assumptions, starting with the simple
case of a homogeneous portfolio as introduced by Vasicek. The potential of sectoral and geographic
2To be sure, one can ﬁnd mention of multi-factor risk sensitivity (e.g. Duﬃe and Singleton (2003, Section 11.3.3)),
but to our knowledge this topic has received at best casual treatment.
3diversiﬁcation is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 provides more detail regarding the speciﬁcation
and identiﬁcation of the default threshold needed for the empirical application, which is presented
in Section 7. There we explore the impact of heterogeneity empirically using returns for ﬁrms in
the U.S. and Japan across seven sectors and analyze the resulting loss distributions by simulation.
Section 8 provides some concluding remarks. A technical Appendix presents generalizations of some
material in Sections 3 and 4.
2 Firm Value and Default
Much of the research on credit risk modelling is based on the option theoretic default model of
Merton (1974). Merton recognized that a lender is eﬀectively writing a put option on the assets of
the borrowing ﬁrm; owners and owner-managers (i.e. shareholders) hold the call option. If the value
of the ﬁrm falls below a certain threshold, the owners will put the ﬁrm to the debt-holders. Thus
a ﬁrm is expected to default when the value of its assets falls below a threshold value determined
by its liabilities.
Following Pesaran, Schuermann, Treutler, and Weiner (2005), hereafter PSTW, consider a ﬁrm
i having asset value Vit at time t, and an outstanding stock of debt, Dit. Under the Merton model
default occurs at the maturity date of the debt, t + h,i ft h eﬁrm’s assets, Vi,t+h, are less than the
face value of the debt at that time, Di,t+h. A more nuanced approach is taken by the ﬁrst-passage
models (e.g. Black and Cox, 1976) where default would occur the ﬁr s tt i m et h a tVit falls below a
default boundary (or threshold) over the period t to t+h.3 The default probabilities are computed
with respect to the probability distribution of asset values at the terminal date, t + h in the case
of the Merton model, and over the period from t to t + h i nt h ec a s eo ft h eﬁrst-passage model.
Therefore, the Merton approach may be thought of as a European option and the ﬁrst-passage
approach as an American option.
The value of the ﬁrm at time t is the sum of debt and equity, namely
Vit = Dit + Eit, with Dit > 0. (1)
Conditional on time t information, default will take place at time t + h if Vi,t+h ≤ Di,t+h.I n
the Merton model debt is assumed to be ﬁxed over the horizon h. Because default is costly
and violations to the absolute priority rule in bankruptcy proceedings are common, in practice
debtholders have an incentive to put the ﬁrm into receivership even before the equity value of
the ﬁrm hits the zero value.4 Similarly, the bank might also have an incentive of forcing the
3For a review of these models, see, for example, Lando (2004, Chapter 3). More recent modeling approaches also
allow for strategic default considerations, as in Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997).
4See, for instance, Leland and Toft (1996) who develop a model where default is determined endogenously, rather
than by the imposition of a positive net worth condition. More recently, Broadie, Chernov, and Sundaresan (2004)
show that in the presence of APR default can be optimal when Eit > 0 even in the case of a single debt class.
4ﬁrm to default once the ﬁrm’s equity falls below a non-zero threshold.5 Importantly, default in a
credit relationship is typically a weaker condition than outright bankruptcy. An obligor may meet
the technical default condition, e.g. a missed coupon payment, without subsequently going into
bankruptcy. As a result we shall assume that default takes place if
0 <E i,t+h <C i,t+h, (2)
where Ci,t+h is a positive default threshold which could vary over time and with the ﬁrm’s particular
characteristics (such as region or industry sector). Natural candidates include quantitative factors
such as leverage, proﬁtability, ﬁrm age (most of which appear in models of ﬁrm default), as well as
more qualitative factors such as management quality.6
We are now in a position to consider the evolution of ﬁrm equity value which we assume follows
a standard geometric random walk model:
ln(Ei,t+1)=l n ( Eit)+µi + ξi,t+1,ξ i,t+1 ∼ iidN(0,σ2
ξi), (3)
w i t han o n - z e r od r i f t ,µi, and idiosyncratic Gaussian innovations with a zero mean and ﬁrm-
speciﬁc volatility, σξi. Consequently, the equity value of ﬁrm i at time t + h is ln(Ei,t+h)=
ln(Eit)+hµi +
Ph
s=1 ξi,t+s, and by (2) default occurs if
ln(Ei,t+h)=l n ( Ei,t)+hµi +
h X
s=1
ξi,t+s < ln(Ci,t+h), (4)













Equation (5) tells us that the relative (rather than absolute) decline in ﬁr mv a l u em u s tb el a r g e
enough over the horizon h to result in default. Using (4), default occurs if hµi+
Ph
s=1 ξi,t+s <λ i,t+h.
Therefore, under (3) the probability that ﬁrm i defaults at the terminal date t + h is given by
πi,t+h = Φ
Ã






where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. In the theoretical discussions
that follows we shall assume that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc default thresholds are given, and do not consider
the eﬀects of their sampling uncertainty on the analysis of loss distributions.
5For a treatment of this scenario, see Garbade (2001).
6For models of bankruptcy and default at the ﬁrm level, see, for instance, Altman (1968), Lennox (1999), Shumway
(2001), and Hillegeist, Keating, Cram and Lundstedt (2004).
53 Cross Firm Default Correlations
In the context of the Merton model the cross ﬁrm default correlations can be introduced by assuming
that shocks to the value of a ﬁrm’s equity, ξi,t+1,d e ﬁned by (3), have the following multifactor
structure
ξi,t+1 = γ0
ift+1 + σiεi,t+1,ε i,t+1 ∼ iid(0,1) (7)
where ft+1 is an m×1 vector of common factors, γi is the associated vector of factor loadings, and
εi,t+1 is the ﬁrm-speciﬁc idiosyncratic shock, assumed to be distributed independently across i.7
The common factors could be treated as unobserved or observed through macroeconomic variables
such as output growth, inﬂation, interest rates and exchange rates.8 In what follows we suppose
the factors are unobserved, distributed independently of εi,t+1, and have constant variances.9 Thus,
without loss of generality we assume that ft+1 ∼ (0,Im),w h e r eIm is an identity matrix of order
m.10
The above multifactor model plays a central role in the analysis of market risk, and its use in
credit risk analysis seems a natural step towards a more cohesive understanding of the two types of
risks and their relationships to one another. A homogeneous version of the factor model has also
been used extensively for the analysis of credit portfolio risk by Vasicek (1987, 1991), as we shall
see to good eﬀect. But under homogeneity of factor loadings where γi = γ and γ0
ift+1 = γ0ft+1,
the distinction between a one factor and multifactor models is redundant.
Using (7) in (3) we now have
ln(Ei,t+1) − ln(Eit)=ri,t+1 = µi + γ0






7A separate line of research has focused on correlated default intensities as in Schönbucher (1998), Duﬃea n d
Singleton (1999), Duﬃe and Gârleanu (2001) and Duﬃe and Wang (2004). There are a host of other approaches,
including the contagion model of Davis and Lo (2001) as well as Giesecke and Weber’s (2004) indirect dependence
approach, where default correlation is introduced through local interaction of ﬁr m sw i t ht h e i rb u s i n e s sp a r t n e r sa sw e l l
as via global dependence on economic risk factors. The idea of generalizing default dependence beyond correlation
using copulas is discussed in Li (2000), Embrechts, McNeil, and Straumann (2001), Schönbucher (2002) and Frey and
McNeil (2003).
8PSTW provide an empirical implementation of this model by linking the (observable) factors, ft+1,t ot h ev a r i a b l e s
in a global vector autoregressive model.
9The more general case where the factors may exhibit time varying volatility can be readily dealt with by allowing
the factor loadings to vary over time, in line with market volatilities. But in this paper we shall not pursue this line
of research, primarily because the focus of our empirical analysis is on quarterly and annual default risks, and over
such horizons asset return volatilities appear to be rather limited and of second order importance.
10The issues concerning the empirical implementation of the multifactor models in the context of credit risk models
is discussed in Section 7.
6which decomposes the conditional return variance into the part due the systematic risk factors, γ0
iγi,
and the residual or idiosyncratic variance, σ2
i. The presence of the common factors also introduces a
varying degree of asset return correlations across ﬁr m s ,w h i c hi nt u r nl e a d st ov a r i a t i o ni nc r o s sﬁrm
default correlations for a given set of default thresholds, λi,t+1. The extent of default correlation
depends on the size of the factor loadings, γi, the importance of the idiosyncratic shocks, σi,
the values of the default thresholds, λi,t+1, and the shape of the distribution assumed for εi,t+1,











where δi = γi/σi is the standardized m×1 vector of factor loadings (systematic risk exposures) of
ﬁrm i.
To derive the cross correlation of ﬁrm defaults, which we denote by ρ∗
ij,t+1,l e tzi,t+1 to be the
default outcome for ﬁrm i, over a single period such that11
zi,t+1 = I (λi,t+1 − ri,t+1), (11)
where I(A) is an indicator function that takes the value of unity if A ≥ 0, and zero otherwise. Then
ρ∗
ij,t+1 =





where πi,t+1 = E (zi,t+1) is ﬁrm i0s default probability over the period t to t +1 .I ti sc l e a rt h a t
the default correlation, ρ∗
ij,t+1, depends on the default thresholds, λi,t+1, as well as the return
correlation, ρij,d e ﬁned by (10). For given values of the thresholds, λi,t+1, a relatively simple
expression for ρ∗
ij,t+1 can be obtained if conditional on ft+1, εi,t+1 and εj,t+1 are cross sectionally
independent and ft+1 and εi,t+1 have a joint Gaussian distribution. In this case
πi,t+1 = Φ







The argument of Φ(·) in (13) is commonly referred to as a “distance to default” (DD) such that





To derive an expression for E (zi,t+1zj,t+1) we ﬁrst note that conditional on ft+1, zi,t+1 and zj,t+1
are independently distributed and
E (zi,t+1zj,t+1)=Ef [E (zi,t+1zj,t+1 |ft+1)] (15)
= Ef [E (zi,t+1 |ft+1)E (zj,t+1 |ft+1)].























where as before δi = γi/σi and ai,t+1 = σ−1














where the expectations are now taken with respect to the distribution of the common factors, ft+1.
As noted by Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2000), under the double Gaussian assumption E (zi,t+1zj,t+1)
is also given by
E (zi,t+1zj,t+1)=Φ2
£
Φ−1 (πi,t+1),Φ−1 (πj,t+1),ρ ij
¤
, (17)
where Φ2[·] is the bivariate standard normal cumulative distribution function.
4 Losses in a Credit Portfolio
Consider now a credit portfolio composed of N diﬀerent credit assets such as loans, each with










, wit ≥ 0. (18)
As u ﬃcient condition for (18) to hold is given by wit = O
¡
N−1¢
, which is the standard granularity
condition where no single exposure dominates the portfolio.14 Suppose further that loss-given-
default (LGD) of obligor i is denoted by ϕi,t+1 w h i c hl i e si nt h er a n g e[0,1].15 Under this set-up





In cases where for each i, ϕi,t+1 and zi,t+1 are independently distributed, the analysis can be
conducted conditional on given values of LGD. In such a case the ϕi,t+1’s could be treated as ﬁxed
values and absorbed in the portfolio weights without loss of generality. However, a more interesting,
12Note that ai,t+1 reduces to the distance to default, DDi,t+1,d e ﬁned by (14) when γi =0 .
13The assumption that N is time-invariant is made for simplicity and can be relaxed.
14Conditions (18) on the portfolio weights was in fact embodied in the initial proposal of the New Basel Accord
in the form of the Granularity Adjustments which was designed to mitigate the eﬀects of signiﬁcant single-borrower
concentrations on the credit loss distribution. See BCBS (2001, Ch.8).
15LGD is often modelled by assuming that ϕi,t+1 follows a Beta distribution across i with parameters calibrated
to match the mean and standard deviation of historical observations on the severity of credit losses.
8and arguably practically more relevant case, arises where ϕi,t+1 and zi,t+1 are correlated through
common business cycle eﬀects. This case presents new technical diﬃculties and is addressed brieﬂy
in Appendix A. For now, and without loss of generality, let ϕi,t+1 =1∀i, t, meaning that a





The probability distribution function of  N,t+1 can now be derived both conditional on an
information set available at time t, It, or unconditionally. The two types of distributions coincide
when the factors, ft+1, are assumed to be serially independent, a case often maintained in the
literature. In this paper we consider a dynamic factor model and allow the factors to be serially
correlated. In particular, we shall assume that ft+1 follows a covariance stationary process, and It
contains at least ft and its lagged values, or their determinants (proxies) when they are unobserved.
A simple example of a dynamic factor model is the Gaussian vector autoregressive speciﬁcation
ft+1 = Λft + ηt+1, ηt+1 |I t ∼ iidN(0,Ωηη),( 2 1 )
where It is the public information known at time t,a n dΛ is an m×m matrix of ﬁxed coeﬃcients
with all its eigenvalues inside the unit circle such that
Va r(ft+1 |I t)=
∞ X
s=0
ΛsΩηηΛ0s = Im. (22)
Along with much of the literature on credit risk, the focus of our analysis will be on the limit
distribution of  N,t+1 |I t,a sN →∞ . T h el i m i tp r o p e r t i e so ft h i sc onditional loss distribution
establishes the degree to which diversiﬁcation of the credit portfolio is possible.16 Not surprisingly,
the limit distribution of  N,t+1 depends on the nature of the return process {ri,t+1} and the extent to
which the returns are cross-sectionally correlated. Our discussion shall be in terms of the variance
of the loss distribution, though occasionally we refer to the standard deviation or loss volatility,
also known as unexpected loss (UL).
4.1 Credit Risk under Firm Homogeneity
Vasicek (1987) was among the ﬁrst to consider the limit distribution of  N,t+1 using asset return
equations with a factor structure. However, he focused on the perfectly homogeneous case with
the same factor loadings, γi = γ, the same default thresholds, λi,t+1 = λ,t h es a m eﬁrm-speciﬁc
volatilities, σi = σ, and zero unconditional returns, µi =0 , for all i and t. As noted earlier a
16The concept of “diversity” of ﬁnancial markets has been recently discussed by Fernholz, Karatzas and Kardaras
(2003), who provide a formal analysis in the context of the standard geometric Brownian motion model of asset
returns.
9multifactor model with homogeneous factor loadings is equivalent to a single factor model. Under
Vasicek’s homogeneity assumptions we have
ri,t+1 = γft+1 + σε i,t+1,
where the single factor ft+1 is also assumed to be serially independent. In this model the pair-wise
asset return correlations, ρij, is identical for all obligor pairs in the portfolio and is given by
ρij = ρ =
γ2
σ2 + γ2. (23)
Furthermore, since default depends on the sign of λ − ri,t+1 = λ − (γft+1 + σε i,t+1), and not its
magnitude, without loss of generality the normalization, σ2 +γ2 =1is often used in the literature,
thus yielding γ = ±
√
ρ. The remaining parameter, λ, is then calibrated to a pre-speciﬁed default





|I t ∼ iidN (0,I2). (24)
Under the above assumptions it is easily seen that
π = E ( N,t+1)=
N X
i=1
witE(zi,t+1)=E(zi,t+1)=P r( ri,t+1 ≤ λ)=Φ(λ).





1 − ρε i,t+1, (25)
with the default threshold given by
λ = Φ−1 (π), (26)
so that the distance to default and default thresholds are the same, and λ c a nb ee a s i l ye s t i m a t e d
from historical default frequency of the portfolio. When default thresholds are allowed to vary
across ﬁrms, identiﬁcation issues arise which are discussed in Section 6. In Vasicek’s model the









For example, for the typical parameter values of π =0 .01,a n dρ =0 .30,w eh a v eρ∗ =0 .05. In
Figure 1, the top left chart labeled “Gaussian” (we shall return to the other charts in this ﬁgure in
Section 4.4 below) provides plots of ρ∗ (ρ,π) against ρ, for a few selected values of π. It is clear that
the default correlation, ρ∗, is related non-linearly to ρ, and tends to be considerably lower than ρ.
Also there is a clear tendency for the (ρ∗,ρ) relationship to shift downwards as π is reduced. For
10very small values of π, sizable default correlations are predicted only for very high values of return
correlations.17
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
4.2 Limits to Diversiﬁcation - Vasicek’s Model
Since the underlying returns are correlated, there is a non-zero lower bound to the unconditional
loss variance, Va r( N,t+1), and full diversiﬁcation will not be possible. Under the Vasicek model
















where π = E (zj,t+1) and ρ∗ is deﬁned by (27). Since,
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Under the granularity condition, (18), for N suﬃciently large the second term in brackets becomes
negligible. Hence, in the limit
lim
N→∞
Va r( N,t+1 |I t)=π(1 − π)ρ∗. (29)
The larger the default correlation, ρ∗, the larger will be the portfolio loss variance. For a ﬁnite
value of N, loss variance is minimized by adopting an equal weighted portfolio, with wjt =1 /N.
For suﬃciently large N, only the granularity condition (18) matters, and nothing can be gained by
further optimization with respect to the weights, wjt.
4.3 Vasicek’s Limit Distribution
The loss distribution for the perfectly homogeneous model is derived in Vasicek (1991, 2002) and
Gordy (2000). Denoting the fraction of the portfolio lost to defaults by x, the following limiting
density is obtained (as N →∞ ):
















, for 0 <x≤ 1,ρ 6=0 , (30)
17Determinants of ρ
∗ in the case where the errors have Student-t distribution with the same degree of freedom is
discussed below. In particular, see (32).
11where φ(·) is the density function of a standard normal. The associated cumulative loss distribution
function is
F  (x |I t)=Φ
·√





As can be seen, Vasicek’s credit loss limit distribution is fully determined by two parameters, namely
the default probability, π, and the pair-wise return correlation coeﬃcient, ρ.T h ef o r m e rﬁxes the
expected loss of the portfolio, while the latter controls the shape of the loss distribution. In eﬀect
one parameter, ρ, controls all aspects relating to the shape of the loss distribution: its volatility,
skewness and kurtosis. It would not be possible to calibrate two Vasicek loss distributions with the
same expected and unexpected losses, but with diﬀerent degrees of fat-tailedness, for example.
In Appendix B.1 we generalize the portfolio loss density under ﬁrm homogeneity to the case
where ft+1 and εi,t+1 may have non-Gaussian distributions. We show that Vasicek’s distribution
is just a special case. As an illustration of this general class of distributions, we derive the loss
density for the case where idiosyncratic shocks are Gaussian but the common factor is Student t
distributed with v degrees of freedom.
4.4 Default Correlations of Vasicek’s Model under Non-Gaussian Distributions
It is well known that asset return distributions are fat-tailed and its neglect might result in under
estimation of default correlations. In the context of Vasicek’s model the importance of this issue
can be investigated by considering the Student t distribution for the innovations (εi,t+1 and/or ft+1)
with low degrees of freedom, tv,w h e r ev>2 denotes the degrees of freedom of the distribution.
When εi,t+1 is Gaussian but ft+1 ∼ iid tv, the computation of the default correlation coeﬃcient,
ρ∗, is straightforward and can be carried out using (16) with ft+1 generated as draws from iid tv.
However, the derivations are more complicated when εi,t+1 is t distributed. In this case we must
assume that εi,t+1 and ft+1 are both t distributed with the same degrees of freedom, otherwise ri,t+1,
given by (25), will have a non-standard distribution and the threshold parameter, λ,c a nn o tb e
derived analytically in terms of π.B u tw h e nεi,t+1 and ft+1 are both t distributed with the same
degrees of freedom, v,t h e nri,t+1 will also be t distributed with v degrees of freedom and we have
π =P r( ri,t+1 ≤ λ)=Tv (λ),
where Tv (·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of tv, and hence, λ = T−1









































12which is comparable to (27) obtained for Gaussian innovations. Expectations here are taken with
respect to the distribution of ft+1 assumed to be distributed as tv.
Figure 1 contains simulated plots of ρ∗ (ρ,π,v) against ρ, for a few selected values of π and for
three values of v: 10, 5 and 3. As the innovations become increasingly fat-tailed, i.e. as v declines,
the curve becomes steeper meaning that default correlation ρ∗ increases more dramatically as return
correlation, ρ, goes up. Moreover, diﬀerences in the default probability, π, matter less as the lines
collapse on top of one another. Note the Gaussian case in the upper left represents v = ∞.T a k e n
together it is clear that as innovations become more fat-tailed, the return correlation becomes the
more important determinant of credit risk compared to the average default probability π,a n d
they can potentially generate extremely large tail losses. For example, using (29) and (27), the
unexpected loss of a Gaussian portfolio with π =0 .01, ρ =0 .3 is 0.021, while the unexpected
loss of the same portfolio but with t3 or t5 distributed shocks are 0.038 and 0.027, respectively.
The unexpected loss with t10 distributed shocks is essentially indistinguishable from the UL in the
double-Gausian case.18
4.5 Credit Risk with Firm Heterogeneity
Building on Vasicek’s work we now consider models that allow for ﬁrm heterogeneity across a
number of relevant parameters. In this section we provide some analytical derivations and show
how the theoretical work of Vasicek’s can be generalized. An empirical evaluation of the importance
of allowing for ﬁrm heterogeneity in credit risk analysis is discussed in Section 7.











where, as before δi = γi/σi are the standardized factor loadings, and ai,t+1 =( λi,t+1 − µi)/σi.I n
addition to allowing for parameter heterogeneity, we also relax the assumption that the conditional
on It the common factors, ft+1, and the idiosyncratic shocks, εi,t+1, are normally distributed with
zero means. Accordingly we assume that
εi,t+1 |I t ∼ iid (0,1), for all i and t,
ft+1 |I t ∼ iid (µft,Im), for all t,
where under the dynamic factor model (21), µft = Λft.A l l o w i n gµft to be time-varying enables us
to explicitly consider the possible eﬀects of business cycle variations on the loss distribution. In the
credit risk literature µft is usually set to zero.19 For future use we shall denote the It-conditional
18This latter result is obtained using (29) and (32),
19With the possible exception of Wilson (1997a,b).
13probability density and the cumulative distribution functions of εi,t+1 and ft+1,b yfε(·) and Fε(·),
and ff(·) and Ff(·), respectively.
To deal with parameter heterogeneity across ﬁrms we abstract from time variations in the
default thresholds (namely set ai,t+1 = ai) and adopt the following random coeﬃcient model
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is a positive semi-deﬁnite symmetric matrix, and vi’s are distributed independently of (εj,t+1, ft+1)
for all i,j and t. Allowing for such parameter heterogeneity may be desirable when ﬁrms have
diﬀerent sensitivities to the systematic risk factors ft+1, and those sensitivities or factor loadings
are known only up to their distributional properties described in (34). A practical example might
be assessing the credit risk for a portfolio of borrowers which are privately held, i.e. not publicly
traded. This is typically the case for much of middle market and most of small business lending. For
such ﬁrms it would be very diﬃcult to obtain individual estimates of θi, and an average estimate
based on θ m a yn e e dt ob eu s e d .
4.6 Limits to Unexpected Loss under Parameter Heterogeneity
The extent to which credit losses are diversiﬁable can be investigated using a number of diﬀerent
measures. For reasons of analytical tractability here we focus on loss variance, Va r( N,t+1 |I t),o r
its square root, unexpected loss, and note that in general
Va r( N,t+1 |I t)=Ef [Va r( N,t+1 | ft+1,It)] + Va r f [E ( N,t+1 | ft+1,It)]. (37)
Because of the dependence of the default indicators, zi,t+1,a c r o s si, through the common factors
ft+1, unexpected loss remains even with a portfolio of inﬁnitely many exposures. The problem
of correlated defaults can be dealt with by ﬁrst conditioning the analysis on the source of cross-






, i =1 ,2,...,N, are independently distributed.
The conditional variance of zi,t+1 is bounded since





Then by the conditional independence of the zi,t+1 we have
























→ 0,a sN →∞ , (40)




Va r( N,t+1 |I t)= l i m
N→∞
{Va r[E ( N,t+1 | ft+1,It)]}, (41)
which is similar to Proposition 2 in Gordy (2003). This result clearly shows that when the portfolio
weights satisfy the granularity condition, (18), the limit behavior of the unexpected loss does not
depend on the weights wit.. Furthermore, this result holds irrespective of whether ai and δi are
homogeneous, or vary across i.
Under the random coeﬃcient model, (34), asymptotic loss variance, given by (41), can be

















ζi,t+1 = εi,t+1 − v0
igt+1 (43)
and gt+1 =( 1 ,−f0
t+1)0. Conditional on ft+1, ζi,t+1 is distributed independently across i with zero





t+1Ωvvgt+1 is the variance contribution arising from the random coeﬃcients model (i.e. due
to parameter heterogeneity). The expected loss conditional on ft+1 is given by


















i=1 wit =1 ,t h e n










| ft+1,It ∼ iid(0,1). (46)
Therefore, using (41), we have20
lim
N→∞










which does not depend on the exposure weights, wit. This result represents a generalization of the
limit variance obtained for the homogeneous case, given above by (29).
As in the homogeneous case, it is also clear that the limit of Va r( N,t+1 |I t) as N →∞
vanishes if and only if ft+1 conditional on It is non-stochastic. Restated, allowing the portfolio
to grow without bound, i.e. N →∞ , eliminates idiosyncratic but not systematic risk. In general,
when the returns are cross-sectionally correlated,  N,t+1 converges to a random variable with a
non-degenerate probability distribution.
The implication for credit risk management is clear: changing the exposure weights that satisfy
(18) w i l lh a v en or i s kd i v e r s i ﬁcation impact so long as all ﬁrms in the portfolio have the same risk
factor loading distribution. To achieve systematic diversiﬁcation one needs diﬀerent ﬁrm types,
e.g. along industry or country lines, and we treat this in Section 5 below.
4.7 Implications of Parameter Heterogeneity for the Loss Distribution
Parameter heterogeneity can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the shape of the loss distribution as well as expected
and unexpected losses. An analysis of the eﬀects of heterogeneity on loss distribution in the general
case, however, is analytically complicated and is best carried out via stochastic simulations, an
approach that we consider in Section 7 below. But useful insights can be gained by limiting the
analysis to the eﬀects of heterogeneity of the mean returns and/or default thresholds across ﬁrms,
assuming the factor loadings and the error variances are the same across ﬁrms.21 This amounts to




wit I (ai − δf t+1 − εi,t+1),
where δ = γ/σ, and ai =( λi − µi)/σ.T h i ss e t - u pi ss u ﬃciently general to allow for possible
heterogeneity in the mean returns, µi, and/or default thresholds, λi. Suppose that ai follows the
random coeﬃcient model
ai = a + vi, vi ∼ iid N(0,σ2
v). (48)
20Numerical values of limN→∞ Va r( N,t+1 |I t) can be obtained by stochastic simulations, taking independent
draws from any given distribution of κi,t+1.
21Further details for the fully heterogeneous case can be found in Appendix B.2.
16It is then easily seen that
E ( N,t+1)=π =
N X
i=1






















These results clearly show that both expected and unexpected losses are aﬀected by mean re-
turn/threshold heterogeneity.
In this relatively simple example the degree of heterogeneity is unambiguously measured by the
size of σ2





















= Φ−1 (π), (51)
and for values of π relevant in credit risk management, Φ−1 (π) < 0. Therefore, for typical values
of π, the eﬀect of heterogeneity would be to increase expected losses. The dependence of π on σ2
v is
monotonic, and the higher the degree of heterogeneity the larger will be π.
To examine the eﬀect of heterogeneity on unexpected losses, we ﬁrst control for the eﬀect of
changes in σ2
v on expected losses by setting a =
q
1+δ2 + σ2
v Φ−1 (π). From (49) it is clear that
this choice of a ensures that E ( N,t+1)=π, irrespective of the value of σ2















where κ = δ/
p
1+σ2
v. Also, the pair-wise correlation coeﬃcient, ρij,i nt h i sc a s ei sg i v e nb y
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Therefore, under E ( N,t+1)=π,i nt h el i m i ta sN →∞the loss variance depends on the degree of
parameter heterogeneity, σ2
v, only through the return correlation coeﬃcient, ρ. From (52) note that
for a given value of δ (the standardized factor loading), ρ is a decreasing function of σ2
v.Ar i s ei n
17heterogeneity (or an increases in σ2
v) reduces ρ, which in turn results in a reduction of unexpected
losses. So, once expected losses are appropriately corrected to take account of the increased ﬁrst-
order risk of dealing with a heterogeneous sample, that very heterogeneity widens the scope for
diversiﬁcation of the credit risk portfolio. Indeed as we shall see in Section 7.4, simulation reveals
that once expected losses are controlled for, ignoring parameter heterogeneity results in signiﬁcant
overestimation of credit risk, especially in the tails.
5 Possible Sectoral or Geographic Diversiﬁcation
The results obtained so far provides the limits to risk diversiﬁcation through inclusion of addi-
tional ﬁrms with diﬀerent idiosyncratic characteristics. For the homogeneous case there is a lower










, where ωt+1 is the volatility of the composite innovation. In both cases
as N →∞ , unexpected losses do not depend on the exposure weights, wit. Furthermore, if the
factors ft+1 are serially independent (as is often assumed in the ﬁnance literature), then the above
bounds hold unconditionally, namely the lower bound to risk diversiﬁcation is given by















Once idiosyncratic risk vanishes, there is no scope for further risk reduction so long as N is suﬃ-
ciently large and wit satisfy the granularity conditions, (18).
There may, however, be important possibilities for further diversiﬁcation if we could group the
ﬁrms into diﬀerent categories with the parameters of each category having diﬀerent distributions.
One might think of these categories as diﬀerent industries, sectors, or countries, for instance, whose
sensitivities to the systematic risk factors can be viewed as draws from diﬀerent distributions. As
a simple example suppose there are N = NA + NB ﬁrms grouped into country A (say Japan) and
country B (say U.S.) such that
A : rAi,t+1 = µAi + γ0
Aift+1 + σAiεAi,t+1,i =1 ,2,...,N A,
B : rBi,t+1 = µBi + γ0
Bift+1 + σBiεBi,t+1,i =1 ,2,...,N B,
where
µAi = µA + vAµi,µ Bi = µB + vBµi,
γAi = γA + vAγi, γBi = γB + vBγi.
Thus, for example, ﬁxed eﬀects for Japanese ﬁrms (A) are randomly distributed around a country
mean, µA, and the Japanese systematic factor loading is also randomly distributed around a country































Therefore, cross-country or -sector dependence arises only through ft+1 and not through the para-
meter distributions themselves, although it is now possible that diﬀerent factors could aﬀect the
ﬁrm returns in diﬀerent countries or sectors.
Consider now the following credit portfolio composed of two separate portfolios each with
weights  t and (1 −  t):
 
(A,B)
N,t+1 =  t
NA X
i=1
wiAI (λiA − riA,t+1)+( 1−  t)
NB X
i=1
















iB → 0,a sNA and NA →∞ ,
meaning the two sub-portfolios have a large number of relatively small exposures. We may compare











wiBI (λiB − riB,t+1).
It is now easily seen that the limit of the unexpected losses associated with these portfolios as

























































where θA =( aA,δ0




vvgt+1, for s = A,B.N o t et h a tb o t h
NA and NB individually need to be suﬃciently large for idiosyncratic risk to vanish.



















Not surprisingly it is optimal to place a larger weight on the portfolio with a smaller unexpected



























which is at least as small as both VtA or VtB. Therefore, the joint sectorally or geographically
diversiﬁed portfolio will almost always be less risky than both standalone portfolios A or B.
6S p e c i ﬁcation and Identiﬁcation of Default Thresholds
The probability of default for the ith ﬁrm, given by equation (6) and repeated here for convenience,
πi,t+h = Φ
Ã






provides a functional relationship between a ﬁrm’s equity returns (as characterized by µi and σξi),
its default threshold, λi,t+h, and the default probability, πi,t+h. In the case of publicly traded
companies, µi and σξi can be consistently estimated from market returns based on historical data
using either rolling or expanding observation windows. In general, however, λi,t+h and πi,t+h can
not be directly observed. One possibility would be to use balance sheet and other accounting data
to estimate λi,t+h. This approach is taken up by KMV, for example. But as argued in PSTW, the
accounting information is likely to be noisy and might not be all that reliable due to information
asymmetries and agency problems between managers, share-, and debtholders.23 Moreover, in a
multi-country setting, the accounting based route presents additional challenges such as diﬀerent
accounting standards and bankruptcy rules that exist across countries. In addition to accounting
data, other ﬁrm characteristics, such as leverage, ﬁrm age and perhaps size, and management
quality could also be important in the determination of default thresholds that are quite diﬃcult
to observe. In view of these measurement problems, PSTW propose an alternative estimation
22This solution assumes that it is possible to take a short positition in sub-portfolio A (e.g. by oﬀering default
protection on that portfolio). If we rule out the possibility of short positions, we must consider possible corner




N,t+1],w eh a v e 
∗
t =0and the smallest




N,t+1] ≤ VtA,w ec a nu s et h ea b o v e
formula for  
∗
t.
23With this in mind, Duﬃe and Lando (2001) allow for the possibility of imperfect information about the ﬁrm’s
assets and default threshold in the context of a ﬁrst-passage model.
20approach where ﬁrm-speciﬁc default thresholds are obtained using ﬁrm-speciﬁc credit ratings and
historical default frequencies.
Suppose that at the end of period t ﬁrm i is assigned a credit rating which we denote by Rt.
Typically Rt may take on values such as ‘Aaa’, ‘Aa’, ‘Baa’,..., ‘Caa’ in Moody’s terminology, or
‘AAA’, ‘AA’, ‘BBB’,..., ‘CCC’ in Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Fitch’s terminology. Suppose also
that over a period of length h, the observed default frequency of R-rated ﬁr m si sg i v e nb yˆ πR,t+h.
Therefore, under (3) and assuming that the number of R-rated ﬁrms are suﬃciently large, this












where ¯ µi and ¯ σξi are the unconditional estimates of µi and σξi obtained using observations on
ﬁrm-speciﬁc returns up to the end of period t,a n dwit is the weight of the ith ﬁrm in the portfolio
of R-rated ﬁrms at the end of period t,w i t h
P
i∈Rt wit =1 .T h en u m b e ro fR-rated ﬁrms at the
end of period t will be denoted by NtR.
The consistency of the above estimating equation requires wit to be pre-determined and non-
dominating. Clearly, other grouping of ﬁrms can also be entertained. For example, ﬁrms can be
grouped by industry or geographical regions as well as by their credit ratings. It would also be
possible to consider averaging over ﬁrms with particular rating histories. In considering these and
many other “types” three important considerations ought to be born in mind. First, the types
should be reasonably homogeneous from the stand-point of default. Second, the number of ﬁrms
o ft h es a m et y p em u s tb es u ﬃciently large so that the estimating equation (56) holds. Third, there
must be non-zero incidence of defaults across ﬁrms of the same type, namely ˆ πR,t+h 6=0 .W i t h i n
type homogeneity is required since equation (56) contains NtR unknown threshold parameters,
λi,t+h i ∈ Rt. Their identiﬁcation would require imposing homogeneity restrictions across the
parameters, and/or ﬁnding new moment conditions that relate the default thresholds to the other
characteristics of the empirical distribution of ﬁrm defaults. This identiﬁcation problem is a direct
consequence of allowing for heterogeneity in default thresholds. Recall that for the case of the
homogeneous Vasicek model, the default threshold is easily identiﬁed; see (26).
In what follows we consider two alternative exact identiﬁcation schemes:
1. Within type homogeneity of defaults thresholds, namely
λi,t+h = λR,t+h, for all i ∈ Rt. (57)
2. Within type homogeneity of distance-to-default
DDi,t+h =




= DDR,t+h,f o r a l l i ∈ Rt. (58)
21Under the ﬁrst identiﬁcation scheme, the common default threshold, λR,t+h, can be obtained










− ˆ πR,t+h =0 , (59)
i.e. we solve for λR,t+h such that ﬁrms in the portfolio with rating R have on average the uncondi-
tional probability of default ˆ πR,t+h. It is easily seen that this equation has a unique, ﬁnite solution
so long as ˆ πR,t+h 6=0 . Under the second identiﬁcation scheme,
ˆ λi,t+h = DDR,t+h ¯ σξi
√
h + h ¯ µi, for i ∈ Rt, (60)
where
DDR,t+h = Φ−1 (ˆ πR,t+h), (61)
and Φ−1 (·) is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal.24 Once
again the estimated default thresholds, ˆ λi,t+h,w i l lb eﬁnite so long as ˆ πR,t+h 6= {0,1}. Condition
(58) imposes the same unconditional probability of default for each R−rated ﬁrm, whereas (57)
simply imposes that this needs to hold on average across R−rated ﬁrms in the portfolio.
Of the two, the assumption of the same distance-to-default seems more in line with the way
credit ratings are established by the main rating companies. First, the idea that ﬁrms with similar
distances-to-default have similar probabilities of default is central to structural models of default.
For instance, KMV makes use of a one-to-one mapping from DDs to EDFs (expected default
frequencies). Second, rating agencies attempt to group ﬁrms according to their (unconditional)
probability of default (subject possibly to some adjustments for diﬀerences in their expected loss
given defaults), and in a structural model this is equivalent to grouping ﬁrms according to distance-
to-default. In our empirical analysis we shall focus on the threshold estimates given by (60), with
a brief discussion of the sensitivity of the results to other identiﬁcation choices for λi,h+t.
7 An Empirical Application: Heterogeneity and Risk Diversiﬁca-
tion
In this section we consider diﬀerent types of heterogeneity across ﬁrms and illustrate their eﬀects
on the resulting loss distribution by simulating losses for credit portfolios comprised of public ﬁrms
from the U.S. and Japan. We form these credit portfolios at the end of each year from 1997 to
2002 and then simulate portfolio losses for the following year. All of the simulation parameters are
estimated recursively using 10-year (40-quarter) rolling windows. The simulations are out-of-sample
in that the models, ﬁtted over a ten-year sample, are used to simulate losses for the subsequent
24Note that Φ
−1 (πi,t+h) < 0 for πi,t+h < 0.5.I np r a c t i c eπi,t+h tends to be quite small.
2211th year. This recursive procedure allows us to explore possible time variation in the underlying
parameters as well as the eﬀects that such time variations might have on loss distributions.
7.1 Data and Portfolio Construction
The loss simulations require an estimate of the unconditional probability of default for each ﬁrm.
These may be obtained at the level of the credit rating, R, assigned to the ﬁrm by rating agencies
such as Moody’s, S&P or Fitch. We estimate probabilities of default recursively for each grade using
10-year rolling windows of all ﬁrm rating histories from S&P. These probabilities are estimated using
the time-homogeneous Markov or parametric duration estimator discussed in Lando and Skødeberg
(2002) and Jafry and Schuermann (2004). We impose a minimum annual probability of default
(PD) of 0.001% or 0.1 basis points. Our estimated PDsf o rb o t hAAA and AA fall below this
minimum for all six cohorts.
In order to be selected for inclusion in our portfolios, a ﬁrm needs a credit rating as well as 10
years of consecutive quarterly equity returns that match the rolling estimation window. In case
both ratings are available the S&P rating is chosen.25 For the ﬁrst sample or cohort (which ends
in 1997) we have 211 Japanese ﬁrms and 628 U.S. ﬁrms, a portfolio of 839 ﬁrms in total. At the
end of the following year the portfolio is rebalanced, retaining surviving ﬁrms and augmenting the
portfolio with new ﬁrms that have a rating at the end of that year, i.e. 1998, and also have 40
consecutive quarters of returns. All returns are computed in U.S. dollars (USD). For Japanese
ﬁrms this is done by subtracting the rate of change of yen/USD exchange rate from their yen-
denominated returns.26 Our analysis and conclusions are clearly conditional on the population of
publicly traded ﬁrms with suﬃciently long track records, and need not extend to ﬁrms that are not
publicly traded or have relatively short histories.
To make the portfolio exposures representative of the rated universe in each country, we re-
weight the portfolio exposures (in USD) by rating in the following manner. Suppose that each
obligor begins with $100 of exposure. If 10% of all rated Japanese ﬁrms have a BB rating, but
15.6% of the Japanese ﬁrms in our portfolio are BB-rated, then each of these ﬁrms will be given
10.0
15.6 × $100 = $63 of exposure. In the U.S. the diﬀerence in the ratings distribution across the two
agencies is modest, but not so in Japan where Moody’s rates more than twice as many ﬁrms as
S&P. To address this issue we take the average of the two agencies’ ratings distributions by rating
for each country.27
25The decision rule is driven by the use of S&P ratings histories to compute the default probabilities πR.
26Our source of return data for U.S. ﬁrms is CRSP while for Japanese ﬁr m si ti sD a t a s t r e a m .
27The precise exposure allocation is as follows. Denote FV ic to be the (face value) exposure to ﬁrm i in country c.
The portfolio total nominal face value is $1bn. Then





· θ(R)c for i ∈ R,
where wc is the share of the total portfolio for country c (75% for the U.S., 25% for Japan), Nc is the number of
23The portfolio composition is adjusted annually, starting with 1998, to reﬂect defaults, upgrades
and downgrades which may have occurred during the year. Since credit migration matrices even at
annual frequencies are diagonally dominant, with average staying probabilities exceeding 90% for
investment grades, annual portfolio rebalancing seems a reasonable compromise between accuracy
and computational burden; the alternative would be quarterly rebalancing. We also update the
ratings distribution each year to allow for compositional changes in the universe of rated ﬁrms. For
example, at the end of 1997 B-rated ﬁrms made up only 1.54% of all rated Japanese ﬁrms, but by
year-end 2002 this proportion had risen to 6.75%. Below in Table 1 we show the average ratings
distribution for each country for 1997 and 2002. It becomes clear that there has been a systematic
deterioration in average credit quality over this period. In addition, estimated probabilities of
default for non-investment grade ratings, and for CCC in particular, have risen noticeably over this
period. As a result, the weighted average annual probability of default, ˆ π, has increased from 1.23%
for the year-end 1997 portfolio to 3.26% for the year-end 2002 portfolio.
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
Using two-digit SIC codes we group ﬁrms into seven broad sectors to ensure a suﬃcient number
of ﬁrms per sector. The sectors and percentage of ﬁrms by sector by country at year-end 1997 are
summarized below in Table 2.
[Insert Table 2 about here.]
7.2 Model Speciﬁcations
To explore the role of geographic and industry or sectoral heterogeneity we introduce two new
indices into the notation of the previous sections. Speciﬁcally, denote rijc,t+1 to be the return of
ﬁrm i in sector j in country c over the quarter t to t+1,w h e r ei =1 ,...,I jc,j=1 ,...,I c,c=1 ,...,C.
The application will explore C =2countries (Japan and U.S.) and Ic =7sectors/industries in
each country. Following the multi-factor return model given by (8), we employ the following return
regressions adapted to our empirical applications:
rijc,t+1 = αijc + β0





, µf is an m× 1 vector of constants, and Σf i st h ec o v a r i a n c em a t r i xo ft h e
common factors, also assumed ﬁxed. In terms of the return parameters of (3) and (8), the expected
return can be written as
µ
ijc,t+1 = αijc + β0
ijcµf, (63)
ﬁrms in country c, θ(R)c is the rating representation adjustment. Note that θ(R)c will vary across time to reﬂect
compositional changes in the rated universe of ﬁrms in county c.
24and the unexpected component as
ξ
ijc,t+1 = β0
ijc(ft+1 − µf)+uijc,t+1. (64)








ijc is the variance of the idiosyncratic component, uijc,t+1.
Following a standard approach in the ﬁnance literature, we model ﬁrm returns using an unob-
served components or factor approach, either single or multiple, with increasing degrees of hetero-
geneity.28 One obvious source of heterogeneity is geography or country. As we have two countries,
we estimate each model speciﬁcation ﬁrst by pooling the U.S. and Japanese ﬁrms (referred to as
the “pooled model” speciﬁcation) and then by estimating two separate models for each of the two
countries (the “modeled separately” speciﬁcation).
The empirical exercise involves a number of variations on the basic ﬁrm return equation given
by (62) using market-cap weighted market returns for each country ¯ rc,t+1 as proxies for two of the
possible m common factors. Sector returns for a country c, ¯ rjc,t+1,j=1 ,...,I c, are computed in
a similar fashion, namely using the market-cap weighted average of ﬁrm returns in that sector.29
The “global” market return index, ¯ rt+1, is made up of just the two countries U.S. and Japan and
is simply the weighted sum of the two individual country returns,
¯ rt+1 = wUS¯ rUS,t+1 +( 1− wUS)¯ rJP,t+1, (66)
where wUS measures the relative size of the U.S. economy. We estimate wUS by taking the average
U.S. share of PPP-denominated GDP over 1997-2002, and obtain wUS =0 .75. To obtain the global
sector return ¯ rj,t+1 for a particular sector j we proceed similarly to (66) and deﬁne
¯ rj,t+1 = wUS¯ rj,t+1,US +( 1− wUS)¯ rj,t+1,JP. (67)
The simplest model is the fully homogeneous return speciﬁcation assumed by Vasicek:
rijc,t+1 = αc + βc¯ rc,t+1 + uijc,t+1, (68)
with uijc,t+1 ∼ iidN(0,σ2
c). For the pooled model, σ2
c = σ2,α c = α, βc = β and ¯ rc,t+1 =¯ rt+1 as in
(66) for c = US and JP.
Next is the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation where we allow αijc to vary across ﬁrms i in each sector
j and country c but holding the error variances ﬁxed across all ﬁrms (σ2
c). The third model
28An application where the ﬁrm returns are linked to observable macroeconomic factors using a global VAR model
is provided in PSTW.
29The weights for period t +1are based on the average of the market capitalization (in USD) at end of periods t
and t +1 .
25speciﬁcation allows for full parameter heterogeneity where ﬁrm alphas, factor loadings and error
variances are allowed to vary across ﬁrms. Here too we estimate two versions, where in the second
we add an industry or sector factor so that each ﬁrm’s returns is regressed on ¯ rc,t+1 as well as on
¯ rcj,t+1. To be clear, for the pooled model, ¯ rc,t+1 =¯ rt+1 as in (66), and ¯ rcj,t+1 =¯ rj,t+1 as in (67),
for c = US and JP.
The fourth and ﬁnal model speciﬁcation is the principal components (PCA) model. See Ap-
pendix C for further detailed account of this speciﬁcation. Using the procedure outlined in Bai
and Ng (2002) we extract ˆ m relevant principal components which capture most of the in-sample
variation in ﬁrm returns. In the application, the procedure resulted in two factors for the U.S.,
three for Japan and three for the pooled model (i.e. when ﬁrm returns from the U.S. and Japan
are pooled). The procedure was conducted for the 1997 cohort of ﬁrms, using the prior ten years of
quarterly data. For tractability the number of factors was kept ﬁxed for the subsequent cohort of
ﬁrms, though the actual factors were, of course, re-estimated. Table 3 summarizes all eight model
speciﬁcations that we consider.
[Insert Table 3 about here.]
For simulation of loss distributions, in addition to the return equations, we also need to specify
the determination of the default thresholds noted in the last column of Table 3. The ﬁrst two
models, I and II, do not make use of credit rating information at the ﬁrm level. The Vasicek model
treats all ﬁrms identically at the country level (for the two-country pooled model, all ﬁrms are
treated identically), and so imposing within type homogeneity of distance to default is identical to
within type homogeneity of default thresholds. Model II uses within type homogeneity of default
thresholds where ﬁrms are typed at the country level, or not at all for the pooled models. The default
thresholds for the remaining models, labeled λi/DDR in Table 3, use the identifying restriction
(58), namely that the distance to default DD is the same across all ﬁrms of a given rating. An




are obtained using (63) and (65),
respectively.
We shall also consider simulation results using the alternative identiﬁcation scheme for the
default thresholds based on (57), which imposes the same threshold for all ﬁrms in a given rating.
Further, to allow for direct comparisons, all models are calibrated to have the same expected loss
within a given sample period.
7.3 Return Regression Results
The return regression parameters, estimated recursively using a 10-year rolling window, are sum-
marized in Table 4. Note that these are all in-sample estimates. We focus our discussion on the
average pair-wise correlation of returns and the average pair-wise correlation of residuals as they
26map naturally into our loss modeling framework. The average pair-wise correlation of residuals is
of particular interest since it gives an indication of how close a particular model is to conditional
independence.
[Insert Table 4 about here.]
Starting with the results in Panel A of Table 4, we note that the in-sample average pair-wise
correlation of quarterly returns for the ﬁrst ten years (1988-1997) is 0.1933 for the U.S. ﬁrms as
compared to the much higher ﬁgure of 0.6011 for the Japanese ﬁrms. But the average pair-wise
correlation for the pooled sample is very close to the U.S.-only sample at 0.1937.30 The factor
models generally do a good job of accounting for the cross-section correlation of returns, at least
in-sample. Considering ﬁrst the U.S. and Japan pooled results, the average pair-wise correlation
of residuals for the whole portfolio is around 0.022 for the Vasicek, ﬁxed eﬀect and single factor
CAPM models. Adding an industry factor reduces that residual correlation to 0.015, and the PCA
model by construction leaves almost no cross-section residual correlation. In-sample goodness of
ﬁta c r o s sm o d e l sa sm e a s u r e db y ¯ R2 (not reported in the table) range from 0.135 for the Vasicek
to 0.229 for the sector CAPM to 0.339 for the PCA model.
Staying with the pooled model, notice the high degree of residual correlation that remains for
the Japanese ﬁrms, ranging from around 42% (ﬁxed eﬀect) to 39% (CAPM). The reason is simple:
the “global” market weighted return, ¯ rt+1, is dominated by U.S. ﬁrms. The overall portfolio average
is low since residuals from U.S. and Japanese ﬁrm regressions are relatively uncorrelated and in
some cases even negatively correlated.
Estimating the models separately for each country helps, and this is seen clearly in the last
three columns of Table 4, Panel A. While the overall average pair-wise correlation of residuals is
quite similar at around 1.5% to 2%, for Japanese ﬁrms it is reduced dramatically, from a range
of 39% to 42% under the pooled speciﬁcation to a range of 2% to 6% when estimated separately.
Similarly for U.S. ﬁrms, the average pair-wise correlation is reduced from a range of 7% to 9.5%
in the pooled approach to a range of 2% to 3.5% when estimated separately. Clearly geographic
heterogeneity plays an important role.
T h er e s u l t sr e po r t e di nT a b l e4a l s os h o wt h eh i g hd e g r e eo fv a r i a b i l i t yi nt h ec oe ﬃcient estimates
that exists across ﬁrms. This is illustrated by Figure 2 where the empirical densities (smoothed
histograms) of the ﬁrm betas based on the one factor or CAPM model (Model IV) are displayed
separately for the two countries. The estimates of the Japanese betas are more tightly distributed
around their mean than are U.S. betas. We see a similar pattern with the ﬁrm alphas. These
30For 1988-1997, the average pairwise correlation of USD-denominated returns for Japanese ﬁrms of 0.6011 is
slightly higher than the average correlation of Yen-denominated returns of 0.5520 due to the common currency
adjustment. However, local currency returns for Japanese ﬁrms in our sample are still noticeably more correlated
than those for U.S. ﬁrms. This pattern holds for the later periods as well.
27results are line with our assumption in Section 5 that the parameters of the return equations across
the two countries can be viewed as draws from two diﬀerent distributions.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Panels B through F in Table 4 show the recursive estimation results using a 10-year rolling
window for the next ﬁve ten-year periods. We note that average pair-wise cross-sectional correla-
tions of ﬁrm returns remain at around 20% through 1999 (though they show a steady decline for
Japanese ﬁrms), but starting with the cohort of 1991-2000 (Panel D), the average correlation for
the portfolio drops to 0.139. The sudden and substantial market reversals in the U.S. in March
2000 and the subsequent market declines probably play a strong role in explaining these results.
Turning now to the diﬀerent models, the basic pattern across models remains unchanged as
we move down the table (and thus forward in time). Figures 3a (U.S.) and 3b (Japan) show the
empirical density plots of ﬁrm betas for three time periods: years ending 1997, 2000 and 2002. We
notice for both countries that the distribution of estimated betas has been shifting subtly to the left.
While the dispersion of U.S. betas has not changed much over the course of these rolling windows,
the Japanese distribution appears to be widening. The (cross-sectional) ﬁrm heterogeneity we seek
to explore here is thus exhibiting some time variation as well.31
[Insert Figures 3a and 3b about here]
7.4 Impact of Heterogeneity on Credit Losses
We simulate ﬁrm returns out-of-sample using (62), assuming that the systematic and idiosyncratic
components are serially uncorrelated and independently distributed, thus imposing the conditional
independence.32 The loss distributions for the diﬀerent model speciﬁcations are then simulated
using appropriate default thresholds with LGD = 100%. All the simulations are based on 200,000
replications.
7.4.1 Comparison of Simulated and Asymptotic Results for the Vasicek Model
We begin by comparing the simulated loss distributions for our ﬁnite-sized portfolio to the as-
ymptotic portfolio results which are available for the Vasicek model. Of interest are loss volatility
31Throughout the analysis we have been assuming time invariant volatilities. While it is well known that high
frequency (daily, weekly) ﬁrm returns exhibit volatility clustering, this eﬀect tends to vanish as the data frequency
declines due to temporal aggregation eﬀects. Nonetheless, we conducted standard diagnostic tests for ARCH eﬀects on
all ﬁrm return regressions in the case of Model III(a) and calculated the percentage of ﬁrm-speciﬁc return regressions
in which the ARCH eﬀects are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. For most periods the percentage of ﬁrms with signiﬁcant
ARCH eﬀects fell between 5 and 10%; the detailed results are available upon request from the authors. Overall the
evidence is not suﬃciently overwhelming to motivate ARCH modeling across all ﬁrms.
32A more detailed description can be found in Appendix D.
28or unexpected loss (UL), given by the square root of (28), and various quantiles or VaRs. The
asymptotic results for this case are given in Vasicek (2002).
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Table 5 reports the loss simulation results for the “pooled” version of Model I for each of the six
rolling windows A through F. The ﬁrst row in Table 5 describes the losses forecast in 1998 using the
model estimated over the sample period 1988-1997. For each year we report the portfolio expected
default rate, ˆ π, which is equal to expected loss under our assumption of no loss recovery and the
average portfolio return correlation, ρ, given by the empirical analog of (23), namely
ˆ ρ =
ˆ β
2ˆ V (¯ rt+1)
ˆ β
2ˆ V (¯ rt+1)+ˆ σ2
u
, (69)
where ˆ β and ˆ σ2
u are computed recursively using Model I. The estimated variance of ¯ rt+1, ˆ V (¯ rt+1),
is computed from the aggregate returns, ¯ rt+1, using a rolling 10-year observation window. For the







, where wit are the exposure weights. Table 5 also reports the
asymptotic and simulated UL and VaRs, as well as their diﬀerences denoted as “granularity.”
Looking across the ﬁrst row of Table 5 we see that our two-country portfolio of 839 ﬁrms,
with an eﬀective number of 638 equal-sized exposures, is relatively close to an asymptotically
diversiﬁed portfolio. Simulated UL is 1.47%, only 7bp above the asymptotic result. Similarly for
the three quantiles 99.0%, 99.5% and 99.9% VaR, the last corresponding to the loss calibration
level of the New Basel Accord (BCBS, 2004), the simulated loss levels are never far from, though
always above, their asymptotic counterparts. For instance, simulated 99.9% VaR is 12.05% of total
portfolio notional, just 23bp above the level achievable with an inﬁnitely large portfolio. Looking
down the table, it is clear that the two-country portfolios for the later cohorts are also close to an
asymptotically diversiﬁed portfolio.
Introduction of credit rating information in the Vasicek model aﬀects the losses through changes
to the default correlation, ρ∗, even though the pair-wise return correlations continue to be the same
across all ﬁrms. From (27) and Figure 1 we know that for any given value of return correlation,
ρ, default correlation, ρ∗, is increasing in the unconditional probability of default, π, so long as
π<0.5. This can be seen clearly by computing the default correlation by credit rating, ρ∗
R,
g i v e na ne s t i m a t eo far a t i n gs p e c i ﬁc default rate, ˆ πR, and the same distance to default by rating
identifying restriction, DDR, given by (58).33 In Panel A of Table 6 we report default correlations
by credit rating for 2003 based on estimates using the last rolling sample window, 1993-2002.34 The
top two ratings, AAA & AA, are combined because we impose a minimum unconditional default
probability of 0.001% per annum; see also the discussion in Section 7.1.
33These correlations can be easily computed using (12).
34We do not report the results for previous years as they are qualitatively very similar.
29[Insert Table 6 about here]
The strong diﬀerentiation of the default correlation by credit rating, ˆ ρ∗
R, suggests that credit
rating is indeed an important characterization of default heterogeneity, even while imposing strict
homogeneity of return correlations. Put diﬀerently, a high default rate for a low credit rating, say
B, is associated with high default correlation, and vice versa. Gordy (2000) reports similar steeply
increasing default correlations as one descends the credit rating scale.35
7.4.2 Loss Simulation Results
Although most of the loss simulations we report below are calibrated to have the same EL across
all models, we start by examining the impact of a simple source of heterogeneity, namely ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀects, on expected and unexpected losses. Recall from the theoretical results in Section
4.7 that the introduction of heterogeneity in ai =( λi − µi)/σ, by assuming ai = a + vi,v i ∼ iid
N(0,σ2
v), resulted in increased expected and, once EL is controlled for, decreased unexpected losses.
Empirically one may introduce this heterogeneity through a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect which impacts µi and
therefore ai. The results are displayed in Table 7, where Panel A shows the impact on EL while
Panel B imposes the same EL across the two model speciﬁcations and shows the impact on UL.
For the ﬁrst cohort, 1998, the simulated EL increases from 1.23% to 1.72%, as predicted by theory.
Panel B shows that UL declines from 1.47% to 1.39%, again as predicted. This pattern holds true
for all six years. Then same point can be made by instead calibrating the Vasicek model to have
the same EL as the ﬁxed eﬀects model, namely 1.72%, in which case the corresponding UL would
be 1.91% versus 1.79% for the ﬁxed eﬀects model.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Recall from Section 7.2 that the portfolio weight based on PPP-denominated output wUS =0 .75.
There is no reason to believe that this weight minimizes portfolio loss volatility — for the given
portfolio EL. To illustrate the portfolio optimization results described in Section 5, we assign ﬁrm
exposures so that each country sub-portfolio has the same EL as the baseline global portfolio:
3.26%. We then carry out simulations for the least year, 2003, using the CAPM Model IV for
the U.S. and Japan pooled model which contains a single common factor with diﬀerent parameter
distributions across the two countries.
The simulated UL for the baseline portfolio is ULUS&Japan =1 .28%.36 Using these simulations,
we also ﬁnd that ULUS =1 .29%, ULJapan =2 .18%, and ρUS,Japan =0 .39. Using (54) and (55), we
35Default correlations across credit ratings can also be similarly computed, and these are summarized in Panel B
of Table 6. The diagonal entries are just the within-rating default correlation presented in Panel A.
36This is slightly diﬀerent from the corresponding ULof 1.27% reported below in Table 8 since we have altered the
ﬁrm exposures to equate EL across the two country sub-portfolios.
30ﬁnd the volatility minimizing weight assigns more exposure to U.S. ﬁrms relative to the baseline of
75%,n a m e l y ∗
US =8 6 .5%, and the resulting loss volatility UL∗
US&Japan =1 .26%, somewhat lower
than the volatility for the baseline portfolio of 1.28%.
Before embarking on a detailed model-by-model, year-by-year discussion of the loss simulation
results, it is helpful to look at Figure 4 to gain an overview of the results. In Figure 4 we show
the loss densities for 2003 across the six diﬀerent speciﬁcations (separate country models). It is
immediately apparent that the models are grouped into two sets. While the models diﬀer in several
ways, the main distinction between the two groups is the use of credit ratings. The more skewed
densities with the mode closer to the vertical axis are generated by two models (I and II) which
do not make use of credit rating information while the other four (III through VI) incorporate
this information. Whatever other sources of heterogeneity may be important, an estimate of the
unconditional probability of default, as provided by a credit rating, clearly has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on the overall shape of the loss density.
We turn now to Table 8 where we report the loss simulations results for each of the six rolling
windows. We proceed by discussing in some detail the loss simulations for the ﬁrst period and then
draw comparisons across years. In addition to the model number and name in Table 8, we provide
the EL calibration using the default threshold λ and distance to default, DD.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
For each year we report the ﬁrst four simulated moments of the loss distribution (note that
the ﬁrst moment or expected loss is the same across all models by construction) as well as three
commonly reported quantiles, 99.0%, 99.5% and 99.9%. We also calculate expected shortfall; the
results are qualitatively no diﬀerent, and so we report here only the VaR results. The ﬁrst set
o fc o l u m n si sf o rt h ep o o l e ds p e c i ﬁc a t i o nw h i l et h es e c o n ds e ti sf o rt h ec o u n t r ys p e c i ﬁcm o d e l s ,
analogous to the presentation of the in-sample regression results in Table 4.
The fully homogeneous model of Vasicek (Model I) generates the most extreme losses and has
the largest unexpected losses. Allowing for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects but keeping ﬁrm error variances the
same, Model II, results in only a small reduction in risk (while controlling for expected losses). UL
drops slightly from 1.47% to 1.39%, the resulting loss distribution is somewhat less skewed (2.8 vs.
3.1) and fat-tailed (kurtosis of 16.9 vs. 19.5), and risk as measured by VaR is a bit lower as well.
For instance 99.9% VaR drops from 12.05% of portfolio notional to 11.14%.
The above simulations do not make use of ﬁrm rating information.37 Model III simply adds
ratings in the form of a rating-speciﬁc default threshold λR and distance to default DDR to the
Vasicek speciﬁcation in Model I. For the pooled model we go from one (two for the country-speciﬁc
models) to seven (fourteen) λ’s, along the lines outlined in Section 6. Comparing Model III to Model
37To be sure, the overall portfolio EL is calibrated using default rates by credit rating, but so far we have not used
this information at a ﬁrm level.
31I, UL drops by about one-third from 1.47% to 1.07% while 99.9% VaR is reduced by nearly 80%
from 12.05% to 6.72%. Credit ratings seem to capture relevant ﬁrm-speciﬁc information, and this
is useful even though the information is grouped together into just a few (seven) rating categories.
Models IV and (b) allow for heterogeneous slopes (factor loadings) and ﬁrm-speciﬁc error vari-
ances, with Model V also adding an industry return factor. Overall the diﬀerence in risk is small.
UL and VaR increase somewhat with the addition of these parameters. Adding an industry factor
above and beyond a market factor with heterogeneous slopes makes little diﬀerence to the resulting
loss distribution as is clear by comparing Models IV and V. UL is nearly the same, 0.86% vs. 0.88%,
as are VaR levels, e.g. 5.56% vs. 5.58% at the 99.9% VaR level.
Finally, the principal components Model VI generates UL results that are similar to Model III,
which is Model I with ratings information, namely 1.08% vs. 1.07%. VaR, however, is higher.
For instance, 99.9% VaR is 7.69%, compared to 6.72% for Model III. In this way Model VI also
generates tail losses which are higher than Models IV and V. Although the PCA model performs
best on an in-sample basis, it is highly unlikely that the conditional independence attained by the
PCA model in-sample would carry through to out-of-sample.
Allowing for geographic heterogeneity in the simple Vasicek case reduces risk as can be seen
by the last set of columns labeled “U.S. & Japan Modeled Separately.” For the Vasicek model this
amounts to doubling the number of parameters as there is one set for each country. UL drops by
about 14% from 1.47% to 1.29%, skewness and kurtosis both decline, as does VaR. For instance,
99.9% VaR declines by nearly 20% from 12.05% to 10.14%.
In general, however, pooled and separate country models generate similar loss distributions.
Modeling the U.S. and Japan separately usually results in lower risk for Models I and II. Once
ﬁrm-speciﬁc factor loadings are allowed for, as in Models IV and V, VaR is actually slightly higher
for the separate country model, although the second through fourth moments are the same. For
instance, in the case of the basic CAPM model, Model IV, 99.9% VaR increases from 5.56% to
5.75%. A similar pattern can be seen when adding an industry factor in Model V. Model VI,
however, shows risk reduction by allowing for country heterogeneity. Moreover, the results for the
last period shown in Panel F, Table 8, indicates that even for the simple Vasicek model, Model I,
pooling need not always increase risk: 99.9% VaR is 17.47% for the pooled model but 17.81% for
the country-speciﬁc model. Indeed for this last period, allowing the parameters to vary by country
increases VaR for all models save the last one, Model VI. Some of these results could be due
to parameter instability and the associated estimation errors. Nevertheless, the model ranking is
robust to comparisons over time, i.e. comparing Panels A through F. Overall it seems that allowing
for country-speciﬁc factor loadings is more important than requiring diﬀerent country models to
have their own speciﬁc factors.
Broadly speaking, risk, measured either by loss volatility (UL) or VaR, declines as model het-
erogeneity increases. The exception seems to be the PCA model (Model VI). Note that the out-of-
32sample loss simulations are performed under the maintened assumption of conditional independence.
Recall from Table 4 that only Model VI had an (in-sample) average pair-wise cross-sectional corre-
lation of residuals which was eﬀectively zero. All other models had some remaining correlation. Put
diﬀerently, while Model VI is conditionally independent on an in-sample basis, it seems that the
others are not. So long as on an out-of-sample basis Model VI is still closer to conditional indepen-
dence than the others, and there is currently no way of verifying this, the other models will generate
risk forecasts which are biased downward, meaning that risk would be underestimated. Measuring
and evaluating out-of-sample conditional dependence is an important topic which requires further
investigation.
It may be useful to return to the loss densities in Figure 4. There are clearly important
diﬀerences across the models. Relative to the Vasicek model which has only three parameters per
country (αc,βc,σc), adding just ﬁxed eﬀects, Model II, does not seem to change the shape of the loss
distribution. However, once credit rating information is included, the distributional shape changes
dramatically. For example, Model III, which simply adds credit rating information to the Model
I speciﬁcation (i.e. it adds just seven parameters per country) yields a loss distribution which is
remarkably similar to those generated by the fully heterogeneous model speciﬁcation. Credit ratings
seem indeed to be a useful and informative summary statistic for ﬁrm-level unconditional credit
risk.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Moving down the panels in Table 8 we notice that the portfolio is getting riskier over time;
expected loss rises every year. If we compare value-at-risk, say at the 99.5%, for a model, say
the one-factor CAPM model (Model IV) applied to the two countries separately, we see that VaR
increases from 4.33% in 1998 to 6.21% in 2000 to 7.66% in 2003.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
Next we check to see if our conclusions so far are robust to the default threshold identiﬁcation
choice discussed in Section 6. Table 9 addresses this issue, where in Panel A we have repeated
several model results from Panel F in Table 8, namely the loss simulation results for the ﬁnal year
under the basic same distance to default identiﬁcation assumption given by (58). Panel B imposes
an alternative identifying assumption of the same default threshold λ, as in (57). First, note that
by construction the two identiﬁcation procedures are identical for Models I and III. Focusing on the
pooled models, we ﬁnd that imposing same DD (58) in Panel A generates levels of 99.9% value-
at-risk that are somewhat higher than those generated by same λ (57) in Panel B. For instance,
looking at the result for U.S. & Japan modeled separately, under same λ, Model VI yields 99.9%
VaR of 9.82% as seen in Panel B, far less than 99.9% VaR of 11.11% in Panel A. We are currently
33exploring more fully these results, but initial closer examination reveals that imposing same DD
generates more extreme tail events for investment grade ﬁr m st h a nd o e si m p o s i n gs a m eλ while the
diﬀerences for speculative grade ﬁrms are more modest. More broadly, however, we note that the
risk ranking across model speciﬁcations is robust to the choice of default threshold identiﬁcation.
What is clear from the discussion is that there is a rich and complex interaction between the
underlying model parameters and the resulting loss distributions. Some of this complexity can
be summarized more simply using the default correlation ρ∗
ij between any two ﬁrms i and j,a s
computed in Section 7.4.1 where we discussed the default correlation by credit rating, ρ∗
R.W e
can conduct similar analysis across a broader set of models that use the same DD identifying
assumption, and these results are summarized in Table 10 for the year, 2003. We report the
portfolio EL for the year, 3.26%, which is the same across all models, the average return correlation,
ˆ ρ, computed using (10), the average default correlation using (27), as well as portfolio loss volatility,
U L ,t a k e nf r o mT a b l e8 .N o t et h a tf o rt h eﬁrst two models, I and III, parameter restrictions result
in only one return correlation ρ for all ﬁrms. Through the introduction of ratings information and
consequently heterogeneity in unconditional default probabilities, we notice a sharp reduction in
average default correlation, ˆ ρ∗, from 1.81% for Model I, to 0.26% for Model III. This reduction
in average default correlation is accompanied by a reduction in UL, as seen in the last column of
Table 10.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
Allowing for richer return speciﬁcations through diﬀerentiated factor loadings increases the
simulated out-of-sample return correlation: ˆ ρ increases from 9.2% for Model III to just above 10%
for Models IV and V, and to nearly 15% for Model VI. Naturally the average default correlation,
ˆ ρ∗, also rises somewhat, from 0.26% for Model III to just above 0.3% for Models IV and V and
0.8% for Model VI. Yet even with this increased default correlation, loss volatility is never higher
than for Model III. Indeed, the PCA model has an implied default correlation which is triple that of
the Vasicek model with rating information (Model III), but with the same loss volatility. However,
looking at the last column of Table 10 we see that 99.9% VaR for Model VI at 11.15% which is
noticably larger than that of Model III at 9.46%.
8C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper we have considered a simple model of credit risk and derived the limit distribution
of losses under diﬀerent distributional assumptions regarding the structure of systematic and idio-
syncratic risks and the nature of ﬁrm heterogeneity. The analytical and simulation results point to
some interesting conclusions. Theory indicates that under the maintained assumption of conditional
independence, meaning that all cross-ﬁrm dependence is captured by the systematic risk factors,
34if the ﬁrm parameters are heterogeneous but come from a common distribution, asymptotically
(when the number of exposures, N,i ss u ﬃciently large) there is no scope for further risk reduction
through active credit portfolio management. However, if the ﬁrm parameters come from diﬀerent
distributions, say from diﬀerent sectors or countries, then further risk reduction is possible, even
asymptotically, by changing the portfolio weights. In either case, neglecting parameter heterogene-
ity can lead to underestimation of expected losses. Then once expected losses are controlled for,
neglecting parameter heterogeneity can lead to overestimation of risk, whether measured by un-
expected loss or value-at-risk. Eﬀectively the loss distribution is more skewed and fat-tailed when
heterogeneity is ignored.
In light of these observations a natural question is: which sources of heterogeneity are most
important from the perspective of portfolio losses? Turning ﬁrst to the return speciﬁcation, ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀects do not seem very important. However, allowing for ﬂexible factor sensitivities does
appear to be important, especially for capturing cross-ﬁrm dependence. If the maintained assump-
tion of conditional independence is violated, i.e. if there remains cross-sectional dependence in the
residuals from the return regressions, then risk will be underestimated. Thus proper speciﬁcation
of the return model is key by allowing for heterogenous factor loadings and the possible addition
of industry return factors.
By contrast, the diﬀerences in pooled versus country-speciﬁc results suggest that further sub-
dividing the ﬁrm return speciﬁcation and error variances by country matters less. Indeed, the
diﬀerences within a given model in the pooled approach compared with modeling the two countries
separately are generally smaller than the diﬀerences across the diﬀerent models. Thus allowing for
country-speciﬁc factor loadings is important, but requiring country-speciﬁc factors is less so.
Finally, allowing for heterogeneity in unconditional probabilities of default, for instance by
grouping ﬁrms according to credit ratings, appears to be of crucial importance. Even if we maintain
the assumption that ﬁrm returns are equi-correlated, going from one distance-to-default to seven,
one for each credit rating, with seven unconditional default probabilities, seems to capture much of
the relevant heterogeneity. In this way the focus of the New Basel Accord on internal (or external)
credit ratings seems well placed.
35A Allowing for Correlated Loss Severity
In this appendix we consider the loss function is given by (19) and assume that LGD variables,
ϕi,t+1, depend on the common factors ft+1. But we assume that conditional on ft+1, ϕi,t+1 and
zi,t+1 are independently distributed.38 A common formulation for LGD is the Beta distribution,
convenient because it is bounded between 0 and 1, with two shape parameters that can be expressed






where Beta(pt+1,q t+1) is a Beta distribution with parameters p and q that depend on ft+1, and

















where κ measures the degree to which mean LGD varies with the business cycle indicators, here
represented by ft+1. Clearly other functional forms and business cycle indicators can also be used.
Note that LGD is assumed not to vary systematically across exposures i but only over t.39
Since
¯ ¯ϕi,t+1zi,t+1
¯ ¯ ≤ 1, ﬁrstly the results (40) and (41) continue to hold. Also under the random
coeﬃcient model (34) we have






























Finally, the limit distribution in this case can also be derived noting that












38For empirical evidence of procyclical LGD, see Frye (2000), Altman et al. (2003) and Hu and Perraudin (2002).
39This formulation ties the two random variables of interest, default and LGD, to the same systematic risk factor(s)
while allowing the factor loadings to be diﬀerent. Again, the basic idea is that credit risk correlations/dependence,
diﬃcult if not impossible to observe directly, are modeled indirectly through the systematic factors. This is both
conceptually desirable because we are using a structural model, as well as pragmatically and empirically useful since
we focus the modeling eﬀort where the data is dense and not sparse.
36B Limit Behavior of Credit Loss Distribution
B.1 Loss Densities under Homogeneous Parameters
In order to show how our approach relates to that of Vasicek, here we consider the homogeneous
parameter case but do not require ft+1 and εi,t+1 to have Gaussian distributions. Since in the
homogeneous case the multifactor model is equivalent to a single factor model, we consider scalar
values for δi and ft+1 and denote them by δ and ft+1, respectively. In this case we note that
conditional on ft+1, the random variables zi,t+1 are identically and independently distributed as
well as being integrable. (Recall that |wizi,t+1| ≤ 1 for all i and t.) Hence, conditional on ft+1 and
as N →∞ ,w eh a v e
 N,t+1 | ft+1,It
a.s. → Fε (a − δft+1).
In the limit the probability density function of  N,t+1 |I t can be obtained from the probability
density functions of ft+1 and εi,t+1, which we denote here by ff(·) and fε(·), respectively. It will
be helpful to write the loss density f (·) in terms of the systematic risk factor density ff(·) and the
standardized idiosyncratic shock density fε(·).
Therefore, conditional on It and denoting the limit of  N,t+1 as N →∞ , by  t+1 we have (with
probability 1)
 t+1 = Fε (a − δft+1). (70)
Now making use of standard results on transformation of probability densities, for δ 6=0we have
f  ( t+1 |I t)=
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂Fε (a − δft+1)
∂ft+1
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
−1
ff (ft+1 |I t),






and |∂Fε (a − δft+1)/∂ft+1| is the Jacobian of the transformation which is given by
∂Fε (a − δft+1)
∂ft+1



















¤ , for 0 <  t+1 ≤ 1. (71)
B.1.1 Relation to Vasicek’s Loss Distribution
The above results provide a simple generalization of Vasicek’s one-factor loss density distribution
given by (30), and reduces to it when µft =0 , and assuming that the innovations, ft+1 and εi,t+1
37are both Gaussian. In this case
ff (ft+1 |I t)=φ(ft+1),
fε (εi,t+1 |I t)=φ(εi,t+1),F ε (·)=Φ(·),
and















, for 0 <x≤ 1, |δ| 6=0 (72)




















Using (73) and (75) in (72) now yields Vasicek’s loss density given by (30) (note that φ(x)=φ(−x)).
Under the double-Gaussian assumption, the distribution of δft+1 + εt+1 (conditional on It )i s
also Gaussian with mean δµft and variance 1+δ2. Therefore,
E ( N,t+1 |I t)=Φ
Ã




Using (75) and (73) the conditional mean loss can therefore be written as







and reduces to π only when µft =0 . It is also interesting to note that under µft 6=0 , Vasicek’s
loss density and distributions become



















, for 0 <x≤ 1,ρ > 0. (77)
For ρ>0, the cumulative distribution function associated with this density is given by

























which shows that good news (a rise in µft) reduces the probability of losses above a given thresholds,
i.e. reduces value-at-risk, as to be expected.
38B.1.2 Non-Gaussian Innovations
It is interesting to note that Vasicek and others in this literature ﬁrst derive the loss distribution
function and then obtain the density - while we obtain the density ﬁrst and then integrate to
obtain the distribution function. One of the advantages of our procedure (aside from lending itself
readily to heterogeneous generalizations) is that it can be used to derive analytic loss densities for
non-Gaussian idiosyncratic shocks as well as non-Gaussian conditional distributions of ft+1.F o r
example, in the case where idiosyncratic shocks are Gaussian but the conditional distribution of
the common factor is t distributed with v degrees of freedom, we have


















and B(v/2,1/2) is the beta function.40
Using (71), other loss distributions can also be generated for diﬀerent choices of the probability
densities of ft+1 and εi,t+1, although they might not be analytically tractable. In such cases the
loss distribution can be generated by stochastic simulations.
B.2 Loss Densities under Heterogeneous Parameters
Here we consider the credit loss distribution under the heterogeneous model, introduced in Section




a − δ0ft+1 − ζi,t+1
¢
. Since conditional
on ft+1, the composite errors, ζi,t+1 = εi,t+1 −via +v0
iδft+1, are independently distributed across i,
then







where as before Fκ (·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standardized composite




¢0 and ωt+1 is given by (44). Once again the limiting
distribution of credit loss depends on the conditional densities of ζi,t+1 and ft+1. For example, if
(εi,t+1,v ia,v0
iδ) follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution, then κi,t+1 | ft+1,It ∼ iidN(0,1).
The probability density of the fraction of the portfolio lost, x, over the range (0,1), can be
derived from the (conditional) joint probability density function assumed for the factors, f,b y









40We veriﬁed that this loss density (and its CDF, computed numerically using quadrature methods) generates very
similar values for the Gaussian in (72) for v =3 0 , and is nearly indistinguishable for v =6 0 .
39For a general m factor set up analytical derivations are quite complicated and will not be attempted
here. Instead, we consider the relatively simple case of a single factor model, where f is a scalar,
f. Suppose f = ψ(x) satisﬁes the transformation, (79), and note that






, for 0 <x≤ 1,
where
¯ ¯ψ0(x)
¯ ¯ = |x0(f)|
−1. In other words, ψ(x) is that value of the systematic factor f which
generated loss of x. In the double-Gaussian case, for example, we have
x0(f)=
Ã
f (δωaδ − aωδδ)+aωaδ − δ (1 + ωaa)




















ψ(x)(δωaδ − aωδδ)+aωaδ − δ (1 + ωaa)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
.
and for 0 <x≤ 1 we have

















This generalizes the result obtained for the homogeneous case, (72), and reduces to it if we
set ωaa = ωaδ = ωδδ =0 . It is also interesting to note that the above limiting loss distribution
does not depend on the individual values of the portfolio weights, wi,i=1 ,2,...,N,s ol o n ga st h e
granularity conditions in (18) are satisﬁed.
C Principal Components Model
For the principal components model where
ri,t+1 = αi + β0
ift+1 + ui,t+1,t =1 ,...,T
the estimates of ft+1 can be computed by application of principal component techniques to the stan-
dardized returns deﬁned by (ri,t+1 − ¯ ri)/ˆ σi,w h e r e¯ ri =
PT
t=1 ri,t+1/T, and ˆ σ2
i =
PT
t=1 (ri,t+1 − ¯ ri)
2 /(T−
1). The number of factors, m, can be selected using the Bai and Ng (2002) procedure. Denote the
number of selected factors by ˆ m and estimated factors by ˆ ft+1, and suppose that they are subject





t+1 = I ˆ m,T −1
T X
t=1
ˆ ft+1 = 0. (80)
41For computational convenience, we actually impose the in-sample restrictions that the estimated factors form an




t+1 = I ˆ m.
40The estimates of αi and βi will be given by ˆ αi = T−1 PT













D Simulation of Returns and Associated Loss Distributions
To simulate h−period ahead individual ﬁrm returns, Ri,t+h ≡
Ph
l=1 ri,t+l, a c c o r d i n gt o( 6 2 )w e
need to simulate ft+l,a n dui,t+l,f o rl =1 ,2,..,h.W ea s s u m et h a tt h ec o m m o nf a c t o r sa r es e r i a l l y
uncorrelated. This seems justiﬁed in our application where market returns are only very weakly
autocorrelated. Taking ﬁrst the case of a single market factor, suppose that ¯ rt+l ∼ iidN(¯ r,s2
¯ r),
where ¯ r = T−1 PT
t=1 ¯ rt,s 2
¯ r =( T − 1)
−1 PT
t=1 (¯ rt − ¯ r)
2 ,and ui,t+l ∼ iidN(0, ˆ σ2
i). Then return
for the ith ﬁrm can be simulated as
r
(s)











where s =1 ,2,..,S are the replications.
For the principal components model where the factors satisfy the orthonormalization restrictions
(80), returns for the ith ﬁrm can be simulated as
r
(s)








t+l ∼ iidN(0,I ˆ m),ε
(s)
i,t+l ∼ iidN(0,1).
For the more general multi-factor case, let µf denote the mean and Σf the covariance matrix of
ft+l. Then returns for the ith ﬁrm can be simulated as
r
(s)































i,t+l is the h-period cumulative return, ˆ λi,t+h is the h-period default return
threshold, Vp is the face value of the whole portfolio (e.g. $1bn) and wi is the fraction of exposure to
obligor i. We assume for simplicity that defaulted instruments have no recovery value. Simulated









The higher order moments of the loss distribution can be similarly simulated.
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Table 1 
Ratings Distributions and Probabilities of Default 
 
  1997 2002 
  Ratings Distribution (%)    Ratings Distribution (%)   
Credit Rating  Japan  U.S.  Both  l (%) R π Japan U.S. Both  l (%) R π
AAA  4.8 2.86 3.35 0.001 0.75 2.37 1.97  0.001
AA  22.62 10.81 13.76 0.001 16.03 9.25 10.95 0.001
A  37.93 25.61 28.69 0.005 29.38 21.49 23.46 0.006
BBB  23.16 22.33 22.54 0.064 34.89 25.67 27.97 0.106
BB  9.94 16.3 14.71 0.481 11.85 15.72  14.75 0.63
B  1.54 19.79 15.22 3.343 6.75 19.62  16.4 5.429
CCC  0 2.31 1.73 36.49 0.35 5.89  4.5  49.78
Portfolio        1.23     3.26
 
Note: The table presents the distribution of firms by rating for U.S. and Japan as of year-end 1997 and 2002. These distributions are 
calculated by taking the average of the distribution for Moody’s and the distribution for Standard and Poor’s. We construct our 
portfolios so that the exposure weights for each country are consistent with that country’s rating distribution. The column label “Both” 
represents the exposure weights by rating for the combined portfolio (75% U.S. / 25% Japan). The final column,  l (%) R π , contains the 
estimated annual probabilities of default (PD) that are used in the simulation exercises. These PDs are estimated using the time-
homogeneous Markov or parametric duration estimator discussed in Lando and Skødeberg (2002) and Jafry and Schuermann (2004). A 





Industry Breakdowns by Country 
 
Industry 
% of Firms at 
Year-End 1997 
 U.S.  Japan 
Agriculture, Mining & Construction 5.3 8.5 
Communication, Electric & Gas  16.7 6.2 
Durable Manufacturing  22.1 34.1 
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate  23.1 14.7 
Non-durable Manufacturing  18.2 24.6 
Service 4.8 6.6 
Wholesale & Retail Trade  9.9 5.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 
 
Note: The table presents the distribution of firms by industry group for both the U.S. and Japan sub-portfolios as of year-end 1997. 
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Table 3 
Specifications of Return Equations and Default Thresholds 
for Separate Country Models, c = US, JP 
 
Models Descriptions Return Specification Default Thresholds
IV a s i c e k rijc,t1  c  cr c,t1  uijc,t1 c/DDc
II Vasicek  FE rijc,t1  ijc  cr c,t1  uijc,t1 c/DDi
III Vasicek  Rating rijc,t1  c  cr c,t1  uijc,t1 R,c/DDR
IV CAPM rijc,t1  ijc  ijcr c,t1  uijc,t1 i/DDR
VC A P M  Sector rijc,t1  ijc  1,ijcr c,t1 i/DDR
 2,ijcr cj,t1  uijc,t1
VI PCA rijc,t1  ijc  ijc
 fc,t1  uijc,t1 i/DDR
Note:Forthe “pooled” models thec subscript is dropped fromallexpressions.
 
 
Note: The table summarizes the return equations and default thresholds for the “separate country” models presented in Table 8.  
,1 ijc t r +  
denotes the return of firm i in sector j in country c over the quarter t to t+1. In Models I through V, 
,1 ct r +  denotes the market-cap 
weighted return in country c over the quarter t to t+1 and 
,1 cj t r +  is the market-cap weighted return for sector j in country c over the same 
period. Model VI, the principal components model (PCA), is discussed in greater detail in Appendix C. For the Vasicek model all firms 
in country c have the same default threshold,  c λ . Default thresholds for Model II, Vasicek + Fixed Effects (FE), are identified using an 
analog of (57) under the assumption that all firms in country c have the same threshold, 
c λ  (note that this results in firm-specific 
distances-to-default, 
i DD ). Models III through VI use identifying assumption (58), namely that all firms in rating R have the same 
distance-to-default  DD
R , to determine default thresholds. This assumption generates fourteen different λ ’s for Model III (one for each 
country/rating pair) and firm specific 
i λ ’s for Models IV through VI.  For the “pooled” country models we drop the c subscript on 
,1 ,1 ,, ct c jt rr ++  and 
,1 ct f +  so that the common factors are global factors as opposed to country-specific factors. We also omit the c subscript 
on 
c λ  and 
,c λR , meaning that for Model I and II there is a single default threshold for all firms and that there are only seven thresholds 
for Model III - one for each rating.   48
 
Table 4 
Average Pair-wise Correlation of Returns and  
In-sample Residuals Based on Ten-Year Rolling Windows 
 
         Average Pair-wise Correlation of Residuals 
  Sample  Average Pair-wise Correlation of Returns     US & Japan Pooled    US & Japan Modeled Separately
  Window US&JP  US  JP  Model  Specifications  US&JP US  JP    US&JP US  JP 
Panel A  1988-1997  0.1937  0.1933  0.6011  I  Vasicek  0.0222 0.0951  0.4217      0.0239 0.0365 0.0607 
          II  Vascicek  +  FE  0.0222  0.0951  0.4217    0.0239 0.0365 0.0607 
 Sample  Size  839  628  211  IV  CAPM  0.0218 0.0797  0.3868    0.0242 0.0374 0.0639 
           V  CAPM + Sector  0.0147  0.0711  0.3869    0.0142  0.0221  0.0227 
          VI  PCA  -0.0001  0.0016  0.0037    0.0000  0.0005  -0.0045 
Panel B  1989-1998  0.2150  0.2114  0.5913  I  Vasicek  0.0235 0.0940  0.3793      0.0249 0.0440 0.0633 
          II  Vascicek  +  FE  0.0235  0.0940  0.3793    0.0249 0.0440 0.0633 
 Sample  Size  854  633  221  IV  CAPM  0.0237 0.0825  0.3553    0.0255 0.0456 0.0666 
           V  CAPM + Sector  0.0177  0.0773  0.3582    0.0193  0.0324  0.0258 
              VI  PCA  0.0003  0.0011  0.0028     0.0000  0.0004  -0.0041 
Panel C  1990-1999  0.2097  0.2237  0.5666  I  Vasicek  0.0533 0.1282  0.3917      0.0627 0.0731 0.1391 
          II  Vascicek  +  FE  0.0533  0.1282  0.3917    0.0627 0.0731 0.1391 
 Sample  Size  842  613  229  IV  CAPM  0.0568 0.1246  0.3807    0.0661 0.0778 0.1473 
           V  CAPM + Sector  0.0419  0.1168  0.3817    0.0417  0.0621  0.0390 
              VI  PCA  0.0000  0.0005  0.0010     -0.0003  -0.0001  -0.0036 
Panel D  1991-2000  0.1391  0.1691  0.4638  I  Vasicek  0.0533 0.1207  0.3427    0.0633 0.0783 0.1359 
          II  Vascicek  +  FE  0.0533  0.1207  0.3427    0.0633 0.0783 0.1359 
 Sample  Size  816  588  228  IV  CAPM  0.0559 0.1206  0.3442    0.0649 0.0821 0.1428 
           V  CAPM + Sector  0.0379  0.1039  0.3470    0.0392  0.0615  0.0427 
           VI  PCA  0.0000 0.0018  0.0030    0.0002 0.0008  -0.0041 
Panel E  1992-2001  0.1309  0.1633  0.4411  I  Vasicek  0.0482 0.1132  0.3282      0.0578 0.0740 0.1277 
          II  Vascicek  +  FE  0.0482  0.1132  0.3282    0.0578 0.0740 0.1277 
 Sample  Size  811  585  226  IV  CAPM  0.0501 0.1135  0.3324    0.0583 0.0772 0.1339 
           V  CAPM + Sector  0.0378  0.1077  0.3361    0.0381  0.0624  0.0421 
              VI  PCA  -0.0007  0.0001  0.0009     -0.0004  -0.0003  -0.0042 
Panel F  1993-2002  0.1545  0.1999  0.4191  I  Vasicek  0.0549 0.1098  0.3332    0.0628 0.0772 0.1254 
          II  Vascicek  +  FE  0.0549  0.1098  0.3332    0.0628 0.0772 0.1254 
 Sample  Size  818  600  218  IV  CAPM  0.0569 0.1157  0.3488    0.0641 0.0811 0.1324 
           V  CAPM + Sector  0.0439  0.1099  0.3543    0.0426  0.0658  0.0391 
              VI  PCA  -0.0008  -0.0006  0.0001     -0.0007  -0.0009  -0.0043 
 
Note: This table presents the results of recursive estimation of return equations using quarterly return data. All estimation results are 
calculated using a 40-quarter rolling window. The results for the “pooled” country models are given in the first set of columns and the 
“separate” country models in the second set of columns. Portfolio determination and sample construction are discussed in Section 7.1. 
Specification of the return models is discussed in Section 7.2 (see Table 3 for further detail). The data source for returns of U.S. firms is 
CRSP. The source for Japanese firms is Datastream. Yen-denominated Japanese returns are converted to USD-denominated returns by 
subtracting the percentage change in the Yen/USD exchange rate. See Table 3 for more detail on model specifications.   49
Table 5 
Analytical and Simulated Loss Distribution Results for Vasicek Model 
Based on U.S. & Japan Pooled Return Specifications 
 
Simulation      Portfolio Size    UL    99.0% VaR    99.5% VaR    99.9% VaR 
Year  ˆ π   ˆ ρ   * ˆ ρ     N N*    Anal. Simul. Granul.    Anal. Simul.  Granul.    Anal. Simul.  Granul.   Anal. Simul.  Granul.
1998  1.23%  13.83%  1.63%     839  638   1.40% 1.47% 0.07%    6.81% 7.00% 0.19%  8.23% 8.48% 0.26%    11.82% 12.05% 0.23% 
1999  1.60%  15.69%  2.26%   854  635   1.89% 1.94% 0.05%    9.17% 9.30% 0.13%   11.07% 11.13% 0.06%   15.84% 15.91% 0.07% 
2000  2.10%  13.71%  2.23%   842  613   2.14% 2.22% 0.08%    10.35% 10.65% 0.30%   12.25% 12.59% 0.33%   16.92% 17.34% 0.42% 
2001  2.27% 8.00% 1.23%   816  619    1.65% 1.75%  0.10%   8.08% 8.39% 0.31%   9.24% 9.66% 0.42%   12.01% 12.72% 0.71% 
2002  2.73% 7.71% 1.32%   811  642    1.88% 1.98%  0.10%   9.22% 9.48% 0.26%   10.47% 10.74% 0.27%   13.42% 13.71% 0.29% 
2003  3.26% 9.20% 1.80%      818  654    2.38% 2.48%  0.10%   11.61% 11.92% 0.31%  13.23% 13.59% 0.36%  17.06% 17.47% 0.41% 
 
Note: This table reports comparisons of our simulated loss distributions for the U.S. & Japan Pooled Vasicek model (Model I) with analytical results for an infinitely large 
portfolio.  ˆ π  is the portfolio EL, the return correlation   ˆ () ρ  is estimated using equation (69), and the default correlation  * ˆ () ρ  is obtained using equation (27).  N is the number of 
obligors in our portfolio. N* = ( Σ wi
2 )
-1 is the equivalent number of equal weighted exposures. Analytical Unexpected Loss (UL), the standard deviation of portfolio losses, and 
Value-at-Risk (VaR), the α-percent quantiles of the loss distribution, are computed using similar expressions to those given in Vasicek (2002). Specifically,  
* 2
,1 2
11 lim ( ) (1 ) ( , ) () , () ,
Nt
n
UL π πρ πρ π ππ ρ
+
→∞
−− =− = Φ −  ΦΦ  A  








A A  where 












A  is the limiting cumulative distribution function for the Vasicek case (see (31)). 
For Value-at-Risk we report α =99.0%, α =99.5%, and α =99.9%.  “Granularity” is the difference between the “Simulated” and “Analytical” values reported.  The simulation 
procedure is discussed in Appendix D. All simulations are carried out using 200,000 replications.   50
Table 6 
Simulated (Out-of-Sample) Default Correlations 
Based on Model II(b) for U.S. & Japan Pooled Return Specification 
(2003) 
 
  Panel A:  Default Probabilities (in basis points) and Correlations by Credit Rating 
            
    ˆR π   ˆ ρ  
* ˆR ρ         
  AAA & AA  0.10 9.20%  0.004%        
  A  0.58 9.20%  0.018%        
  BBB  10.59 9.20%  0.170%        
  BB  63.03 9.20%  0.615%        
  B  542.88 9.20%  2.437%        
  CCC  4,977.60 9.20%  5.865%        
            
            
  Panel B:  Default Correlations by Credit Rating 
            
    AAA & AA A  BBB  BB  B  CCC   
  AAA & AA  0.004%  - - - - -   
  A  0.009%  0.018%  - - - -   
  BBB  0.026% 0.054%  0.170%  -  -  -   
  BB  0.048%  0.100% 0.320% 0.615%  -  -  
  B  0.086%  0.183% 0.607% 1.199% 2.437%  -  
  CCC  0.102%  0.224% 0.792% 1.636% 3.560% 5.865%   
 
Note: This table reports simulated (out-of-sample) default correlations by rating for Model III for the final simulation year, 2003. Recall that for the pooled version of Model III 
the pair-wise correlation of simulated (out-of-sample) returns is the same for all firms and is the same as in the Vasicek model (i.e. 
, ˆˆ ,
ij ij ρρ =∀ where  ˆ ρ  is given by equation 
(69)).  Pair-wise correlations of simulated (out-of-sample) defaults are obtained as described in Section 7.4.1, using equation (16) in (12). 
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Table 7 
The Impact of Parameter Heterogeneity on the Loss Distribution 
 
Panel A  The Impact on Expected Losses (EL) of Allowing for Fixed Effects    
        
    Simulated EL   
  Year Vasicek  Fixed  Effect   
  1998  1.23% 1.72%   
  1999  1.60% 2.17%   
  2000  2.10% 2.67%   
  2001  2.28% 2.93%   
  2002  2.74% 3.28%   
  2003  3.26% 3.65%   
        
Panel B  The Impact on Unexpected Losses (UL) of Allowing for Fixed Effects  
        
    Simulated UL   
  Year Vasicek  Fixed  Effect   
  1998  1.47% 1.39%   
  1999  1.94% 1.84%   
  2000  2.22% 2.10%   
  2001  1.75% 1.68%   
  2002  1.98% 1.90%   
  2003  2.48% 2.40%   
        
 
Note: The results in Panel A compare Expected Losses (EL) for the U.S. & Japan Pooled version of Model I (Vasicek) with EL allowing for firm fixed effects, 
i α , where we have 
deliberately not equalized EL with Model I. The results in Panel B compare Unexpected Losses (UL) for the U.S. & Japan Pooled version of the Vasicek model (Model I) with UL 
for Model II – Vasicek with Fixed Effect. In Panel B, we have equalized EL across the two models for each year. The simulation procedure is discussed in Appendix D. All 
simulations are carried out using 200,000 replications.   52
Table 8 
Out-of-Sample Simulated Annual Losses Based on 10-Year Rolling Return Regressions 
200,000 replications 
 
            US & Japan Pooled    US & Japan Modeled Separately   
 Simulation  Using      Default        Value-at-Risk         Value-at-Risk   
 Year  Sample  Model  Specifications  Thresholds  UL Skew.  Kurt. 99.0% 99.5% 99.9%    UL Skew.  Kurt.  99.0%  99.5% 99.9%  
Panel A  1998 1988-1997 I Vasicek  λc /  DDc     1.47%  3.1  19.5  7.00%  8.48%  12.05%     1.29%  2.6  15.5  6.10%  7.22%  10.14%   
       II Vasicek  +  FE  λc /  DDc,i   1.39%  2.8  16.9  6.57%  7.86% 11.14%   1.23%  2.5  14.2 5.80% 6.82%  9.51%   
  ˆ π  =  1.23%  III Vasicek  +  Rating  λi /  DDR    1.07% 1.3  5.8 4.57% 5.19% 6.72%   1.01%  1.1  5.1  4.30% 4.81%  6.17%   
       IV CAPM  λi /  DDR    0.86% 1.0  5.9 3.73% 4.19% 5.56%   0.88%  1.0  5.7  3.82% 4.33%  5.75%   
       V  CAPM + Sector  λi /  DDR    0.88% 1.0  6.1 3.81% 4.32% 5.58%   0.90%  1.1  5.9  3.89% 4.42%  5.81%   
        VI PCA  λi /  DDR      1.08% 1.6  8.8 4.82% 5.62% 7.69%     1.07%  1.5  7.8  4.74%  5.47%  7.30%   
Panel B  1999 1989-1998 I Vasicek  λc /  DDc     1.94%  3.0  18.1  9.30%  11.13%  15.91%     1.73%  2.8  17.9  8.25%  9.77%  14.04%   
       II Vasicek  +  FE  λc /  DDc,i   1.84%  2.8  16.3  8.76% 10.43%  14.75%   1.65%  2.7  16.3 7.86% 9.31% 13.12%  
  ˆ π  =  1.60%  III Vasicek  +  Rating  λi /  DDR    1.28% 1.4  6.7 5.80% 6.62% 8.52%   1.21%  1.4  6.7  5.50% 6.23%  7.95%   
       IV CAPM  λi /  DDR    0.95% 1.3  8.2 4.53% 5.16% 6.93%   0.98%  1.4  8.7  4.67% 5.35%  7.06%   
       V  CAPM + Sector  λi /  DDR    0.99% 1.2  7.4 4.64% 5.31% 7.06%   1.04%  1.5  8.9  4.88% 5.59%  7.67%   
        VI PCA  λi /  DDR      1.20% 1.7  9.3 5.69% 6.58% 8.88%     1.20%  1.8  10.4  5.72%  6.70%  8.95%   
Panel C  2000 1990-1999 I Vasicek  λc /  DDc    2.22%  2.6  14.7  10.65% 12.59% 17.34%   2.06%  2.4  12.7 9.78% 11.61% 15.87%  
       II Vasicek  +  FE  λc /  DDc,i    2.10%  2.4  13.1  10.03% 11.81% 16.17%   1.97%  2.3  11.7 9.34% 10.97% 14.87%  
  ˆ π  =  2.10%  III Vasicek  +  Rating  λi /  DDR    1.43% 1.2  5.5 6.56% 7.35% 9.18%   1.39%  1.1  5.3  6.37% 7.17%  8.91%   
       IV CAPM  λi /  DDR    1.05% 1.0  6.3 5.23% 5.85% 7.54%   1.12%  1.1  6.1  5.51% 6.21%  7.99%   
       V  CAPM + Sector  λi /  DDR    1.09% 1.0  5.7 5.33% 5.94% 7.56%   1.19%  1.1  6.2  5.74% 6.45%  8.25%   
        VI PCA  λi /  DDR     1.39%  1.5  7.7  6.68%  7.69%  10.16%     1.40%  1.6  8.4  6.77%  7.79%  10.46%     53
Table 8 (continued) 
Out-of-Sample Simulated Annual Losses Based on 10-Year Rolling Return Regressions 
200,000 replications 
            US & Japan Pooled    US & Japan Modeled Separately   
 Simulation  Using      Default        Value-at-Risk         Value-at-Risk   
 Year  Sample  Model  Specifications  Thresholds  UL Skew.  Kurt. 99.0% 99.5% 99.9%    UL Skew.  Kurt. 99.0% 99.5% 99.9%  
Panel D   2001 1991-2000 I Vasicek  λc /  DDc     1.75%  1.8  8.6  8.39%  9.66%  12.72%      1.72% 1.7  8.2  8.20% 9.38%  12.04%  
       II Vasicek  +  FE  λc /  DDc,i   1.68%  1.7  7.8  8.00%  9.22% 12.05%    1.65% 1.6  7.4  7.81% 8.91%  11.31%  
  ˆ π  =  2.28%  III Vasicek  +  Rating  λi /  DDR    1.22% 0.7  3.8 5.71% 6.23% 7.38%    1.23% 0.7  3.9  5.71% 6.23% 7.40%  
       IV CAPM  λi /  DDR    1.13% 0.8  4.4 5.54% 6.09% 7.46%    1.20% 0.8  4.5  5.76% 6.31% 7.69%  
       V  CAPM + Sector  λi /  DDR    1.18% 0.7  4.2 5.64% 6.20% 7.57%    1.27% 0.8  4.4  5.96% 6.58% 8.06%  
        VI PCA  λi /  DDR      1.44% 1.1  5.4 6.74% 7.55% 9.49%      1.44% 1.1  5.5  6.75% 7.57% 9.66%  
Panel E  2002 1992-2001 I Vasicek  λc /  DDc     1.98%  1.6  7.3  9.48%  10.74%  13.71%     1.96%  1.6  7.5  9.45%  10.62%  13.65%   
       II Vasicek  +  FE  λc /  DDc,i   1.90%  1.6  6.9  9.15% 10.32%  12.97%   1.90%  1.6  7.0  9.17% 10.28%  13.06%  
  ˆ π  =  2.74%  III Vasicek  +  Rating  λi /  DDR    1.34% 0.5  3.4 6.32% 6.80% 7.91%    1.35% 0.6  3.5  6.39% 6.91% 8.07%  
       IV CAPM  λi /  DDR    1.16% 0.5  3.7 5.87% 6.38% 7.55%    1.22% 0.6  3.9  6.08% 6.61% 7.89%  
       V  CAPM + Sector  λi /  DDR    1.19% 0.6  3.8 5.98% 6.50% 7.73%    1.26% 0.7  4.1  6.25% 6.82% 8.23%  
        VI PCA  λi /  DDR      1.42% 0.9  4.8 6.95% 7.68% 9.43%      1.44% 1.0  5.2  7.03% 7.81% 9.86%  
Panel F  2003 1993-2002 I Vasicek  λc /  DDc    2.48%  1.8  8.0  11.92% 13.59% 17.47%   2.56%  1.8  8.2  12.20%  13.89%  17.81%  
       II Vasicek  +  FE  λc /  DDc,i    2.40%  1.7  7.5  11.54% 13.06% 16.84%   2.48%  1.7  7.8  11.84%  13.46%  17.07%  
  ˆ π  =  3.26%  III Vasicek  +  Rating  λi /  DDR    1.51% 0.6  3.7 7.46% 8.06% 9.46%    1.56% 0.7  3.9  7.65% 8.28% 9.86%  
       IV CAPM  λi /  DDR    1.27% 0.8  4.7 6.98% 7.64% 9.21%    1.27% 0.8  5.0  7.00% 7.66% 9.30%  
       V  CAPM + Sector  λi /  DDR    1.28% 0.8  4.7 7.01% 7.64% 9.20%    1.30% 0.9  5.2  7.15% 7.83% 9.60%  
        VI PCA  λi /  DDR     1.51%  1.1  5.9  7.96%  8.93%  11.15%      1.49% 1.2  6.2  7.91% 8.85%  11.11%  
 
Note: This table presents results for simulated out-of-sample annual loss distributions (4-quarter ahead loss distributions). The table presents simulation results for the “pooled” 
country models in the first set of columns and the “separate” country models in the second set of columns. Model specifications, including the return regressions and determination 
of default thresholds, are discussed in Section 7.2 (see Table 3 for more detail on the model specifications). The simulation routine is discussed in Appendix D. Simulation are 
carried out using 200,000 replications. For each year all models are calibrated to have the same Expect Loss given by  ˆ π . For each simulation, the table reports the standard 
deviation of losses (denoted Unexpected Losses - UL), the 3
rd and 4
th moments of the loss distributions, as well as the 99.0%, 99.5% and 99.9% quantiles of the distribution 
(denoted Value-at-Risk).   54
Table 9 
Comparison of Alternative Methods of Identification of Default Thresholds  
(2003) 
200,000 replications 
Panel A:  Same Distance to Default by Rating: DDR                    
         US & Japan Pooled    US & Japan Modeled Separately   
 Simulation  Using            Value-at-Risk        Value-at-Risk   
 Year  Sample  Model  Specifications    UL  Skew.  Kurt.  99.0% 99.5% 99.9%    UL  Skew.  Kurt.  99.0% 99.5% 99.9%   
  2003 1993-2002  I Vasicek      2.48%  1.8  8.0  11.92% 13.59% 17.47%     2.56%  1.8  8.2  12.20% 13.89% 17.81%  
       III Vasicek + Rating    1.51%  0.6  3.7  7.46%  8.06% 9.46%    1.56%  0.7  3.9  7.65% 8.28% 9.86%   
  ˆ π  =  3.26%  IV  CAPM    1.27%  0.8  4.7  6.98% 7.64% 9.21%    1.27%  0.8  5.0  7.00% 7.66% 9.30%   
       V  CAPM + Sector    1.28%  0.8  4.7  7.01%  7.64% 9.20%    1.30%  0.9  5.2  7.15% 7.83% 9.60%   
        VI PCA     1.51%  1.1  5.9  7.96%  8.93% 11.15%      1.49%  1.2  6.2  7.91%  8.85% 11.11%  
                            
                            
Panel B:  Same Default Threshold by Rating: λR                    
         US & Japan Pooled    US & Japan Modeled Separately   
 Simulation  Using            Value-at-Risk        Value-at-Risk   
 Year  Sample  Model  Specifications    UL  Skew.  Kurt.  99.0% 99.5% 99.9%    UL  Skew.  Kurt.  99.0% 99.5% 99.9%   
  2003 1993-2002  I Vasicek      2.48%  1.8  8.0  11.92% 13.59% 17.47%     2.56%  1.8  8.2  12.20% 13.89% 17.81%  
       III Vasicek + Rating    1.51%  0.6  3.7  7.46%  8.06% 9.46%    1.56%  0.7  3.9  7.65% 8.28% 9.86%   
  ˆ π  =  3.26%  IV  CAPM    1.23%  0.7  4.1  6.76% 7.36% 8.63%    1.21%  0.6  4.1  6.64% 7.19% 8.53%   
       V  CAPM + Sector    1.25%  0.7  4.2  6.81%  7.42% 8.76%    1.24%  0.7  4.4  6.83% 7.43% 8.86%   
        VI PCA     1.42%  0.8  4.6  7.44%  8.18% 9.83%     1.39%  0.9  4.8  7.39% 8.13% 9.82%   
 
Note: This table compares the two identification methods for default thresholds discussed in Section 3 for the final simulation year, 2003. Panel A repeats the five models from 
Table 8 that are calibrated according to the identifying restriction (58), same distance-to-default by rating. Panel B presents results for these models using identifying restriction 
(57), namely that all firms with a given rating have the same default threshold, λR. For the “separate” country models, we only impose that all firms in a given country with the 
same rating have the same threshold 
,c λR . Thus, there are 7 thresholds for the “pooled” models and 14 thresholds for the “separate” country models.  See also the notes to Table 8. 
Fore more details on the model specifications, please see Table 3.   55
Table 10 
Comparison of  ˆ ρ  and 
* ˆ ρ  for Models Using Same Distance to Default Identification Restrictions 
Based on U.S. and Japan Pooled Return Specifications 
(2003) 
 
Simulation Using       Simulated 
Year  Sample  Model Specifications  Parameter Restrictions  ˆ ρ  
* ˆ ρ   UL 99.9%  VaR
2003 1993-2002 I Vasicek   
**
,, ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ;, ,
ii j i j ii j ππ ρ ρ ρ ρ =∀ = =∀   9.20% 1.80%  2.48% 17.47% 
     III Vasicek  +  Rating 
**
,, , ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ;, ; ,
i R ij ij RR iR i j iR jR ππ ρ ρ ρ ρ ′ ′ = ∀∈ = ∀ = ∀∈ ∈   9.20% 0.26%  1.51%  9.46% 
ˆ π  =   3.26%  IV CAPM  ˆˆ ; iR iR ππ = ∀∈   10.09% 0.32%  1.27%  9.21% 
     V  CAPM + Sector  ˆˆ ; iR iR ππ = ∀∈   10.35% 0.33%  1.28%  9.20% 
      VI PCA    ˆˆ ; iR iR ππ = ∀∈   14.77% 0.80%  1.51%  11.15% 
 
Note: This table compares the average pair-wise correlation of simulated (out-of-sample) returns,  ˆ ρ , where the average is take over  , ˆ
ij ij ρ ∀ > , and the average pair-wise 
correlation of simulated (out-of-sample) defaults, 
* ˆ ρ , across models for the final simulation year, 2003.  These results are only presented for the six models that use the same 
distance-to-default identifying restriction, equation (58).  Pair-wise correlations of simulated (out-of-sample) returns, 
, ˆ
ij ρ , are given by equation (10).  Pair-wise correlations of 
simulated (out-of-sample) defaults, 
*
, ˆij ρ , are obtained using equation (16) in (12) as described in Section 7.4.1.  For more detail on the model specifications, please see Table 3.   56
Figure 1 
Relationship between Default Correlation (ρ*) and Return Correlation (ρ) for different values  






































































** (,,) ρρ π ρ υ =  is calculated using equation (32) for the Student t-distribution with υ degrees of freedom and using equation (27) for the Gaussian case.  The expectations 
in equations (32) are evaluated using 1 million draws of ft+1.   57
Figure 2 
Kernel Density Estimates of Estimated Betas  

















Japan 1988 - 1997
 
 
Note: Estimated betas are from Model IV – CAPM where U.S. & Japan are modeled separately.  All densities are estimated with an Epanechnikov kernel using Silverman’s (1986) 
optimal bandwidth.   58
 
Figure 3a 
Kernel Density Estimates of Estimated Betas 

















U.S. 1991 - 2000
U.S. 1993 - 2003
 
 
Note: Estimated betas are from Model IV – CAPM where U.S. & Japan are modeled separately. All densities are estimated with an Epanechnikov kernel using Silverman’s (1986) 
optimal bandwidth.   59
 
Figure 3b 
Kernel Density Estimates of Estimated Betas 
















Japan 1988 - 1997
Japan 1991 - 2000
Japan 1993 - 2003
 
 
Note: Estimated betas are from Model IV – CAPM where U.S. & Japan are modeled separately. All densities are estimated with an Epanechnikov kernel using Silverman’s (1986) 
optimal bandwidth.   60
 
Figure 4 
Alternative Simulated Loss Densities 







































Loss (%  of Portfolio)
I - Vasicek
II - Vasicek + FE
III - Vasciek + Rating
IV - CAPM




II - Vasicek + FE
III - Vasicek + Rating
VI - PCA
IV - CAPM V - CAPM + Sector
 
 
Note: All densities are estimated with an Epanechnikov kernel using Silverman’s (1986) optimal bandwidth. For more details on the model specifications, please see Table 3. CESifo Working Paper Series 
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